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REGULATING COMPETITION IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Introduction
Antitrust and copyright law both seek to enhance consumer
welfare through various incentives and penalties. For antitrust, the
goal of consumer welfare takes the form of an emphasis on firms'
pricing and output decisions; antitrust is generally satisfied if firms do
not reduce output and price above marginal cost. Thus, for example,
antitrust condemns conduct such as price fixing and horizontal market
division in order to protect consumers from the deadweight losses such
practices produce. Absent such protection, producers could extract
supracompetitive profits from consumers by reducing output below
the level that would be sustained by a competitive market, driving
prices to a level higher than could be sustained by a competitive
market. The antitrust laws thus give the price mechanism relatively
free reign to achieve the optimal (efficient) allocation of resources.
Copyright's conception of consumer welfare is slightly different;
copyright seeks to promote innovation in and production of creative
arts for the benefit of the public as a whole. Copyright pursues this
goal through a rate of return analysis: borrowing from Samuel
Johnson's admonition that "[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote,
except for money,"1 copyright focuses on promoting investment in the
creative arts by preserving for the creator (and his or her investors)
such returns as the market will confer upon the exclusive control over
copying of a work. The law reasonably fears that without such
protection investment in the creative arts would be suboptimal
because the creator would have to share the returns from copies of the
work with others who had not borne any of the expense of creation.2
Works that would yield a sufficient return to be produced under a
regime of copyright enforcement might not produce a sufficient return
to justify production without such enforcement, and thus presumably
would not be produced at all. Such returns may or may not be
supracompetitive; as with other forms of property the returns will be a
1. 4 JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 29 (A. Birrell ed., 1904).
2. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
("The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge
a fair return for their labors."); William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1687 (1988) ("[T]he elaborate combination of grants and reservations that
comprise the Copyright Act is designed to advance the public welfare by rewarding creative
intellectual effort sufficiently to encourage talented people to engage in it, while at the same time
making the fruits of their genius accessible to as many people as possible as quickly and as
cheaply as possible.") [hereinafter Fisher, Fair Use].
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function of market forces, most prominently the availability of
acceptable substitutes for the copyrighted work and the ease with
which such substitutes could be created. If close substitutes exist for a
given item of intellectual property, or could readily be introduced in
the short term, a grant of copyright will not confer the power to charge
supracompetitive prices.3
For the most part, antitrust and copyright follow a parallel course,
complementing one another in the promotion of consumer welfare by
promoting investment in creative works and monitoring the structure
of the markets in which such works compete. But conflicts, real or
apparent, have begun to emerge in recent years, particularly in the
software industry. Software firms (Microsoft being the obvious
example) have begun to achieve a scale that, at least in the minds of
some, equates with a monopoly position with respect to certain
products or systems.4 Whatever their merit, these concerns may be
addressed through traditional antitrust analysis and do not pose
copyright issues in and of themselves.5 The situation may be different
with respect to a number of more interesting issues that have arisen
concerning the nature and scope of the rights that may be asserted in
copyrighted software. These issues pose questions relating to how
broad the protection of a copyright should be, and whether markets in
computer software display economic characteristics-such as natural
monopoly-that have long been considered sufficient to invoke
antitrust and other forms of regulation.
Several firms have asserted in litigation that one or another type
of software constituted an "essential facility" under the antitrust laws.
For example, a firm that makes software providing additional features
for a spreadsheet program might sue the maker of the program
seeking a compulsory license on the ground that access to the software
3. See Fisher, Fair Use, supra note 2, at 1703; see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, § 2.2
(1995) ("[T]here will often be sufficient actual or close substitutes for intellectual property to
prevent the owner from exercising market power.") [hereinafter DOJ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
GUIDELINES].
4. Monopoly status, however, does not in and of itself violate the Sherman Act. A firm
that achieves a monopoly simply by virtue of a superior product, or more efficient means of
producing even a homogeneous product, does not violate the antitrust laws.
5. With respect to issues of firm size and supply and demand elasticities, intellectual
property rights are simply assets, comparable with respect to these issues to assets any other sort
of supposed monopolist might have. Though altering the scope of a copyright could certainly
alter a firm's market position, the same could be said for rights attendant to any property the
firm used or sold. See DOJ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at § 2.2.
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code, including such copying as was necessary to make the access
meaningful, was essential to the continued viability of its own
program. Or a firm that provides maintenance and repair services for
certain machinery might sue the manufacturer claiming that it needed
to run (and thus copy) certain software in order to service the
machinery. As applied to Microsoft, the essential facilities notion is
rapidly gaining popularity; even the New York Times Magazine, not
previously known as a repository of antitrust theory, has published an
article opining that Microsoft's architectures "are an essential
facility-to use the antitrust jargon .... ,6 More informed observers
of the antitrust scene appear captivated by the idea. Robert Pitofsky,
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, stated that "[t]he
foremost question facing antitrust is when you get a firm that achieves
monopoly and is also an essential facility, what should we do?"'7
These issues highlight a point of divergence between the antitrust
and copyright laws. Antitrust, to borrow a well-worn phrase, seeks to
protect competition, not competitors.8 More formally, antitrust seeks
to ensure that firms price at marginal cost rather than above or below
that cost (though prices below marginal cost are worrisome only if
they can later be recouped by imposition of prices above marginal
cost).9 Although a debate on the subject continues, antitrust is not
properly concerned with the distribution of wealth among firms, but
only with wealth maximization through the efficient allocation of
resources via the price mechanism. The economic analysis necessary to
accomplish antitrust's mission is taken largely from the fields of price
theory and industrial organizations, which examine structural elements
of markets and the operation of price as a method of allocating
resources.
In contrast, copyright has legitimate firm-specific concerns. As
noted above, production and innovation in intellectual property, as
elsewhere, is a function of investment. Investments are functions of
available returns, including returns that could be earned on
6. James Gleik, The Microsoft Monopoly, N.YTIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 50,
64.
7. Katring M. Dewey, A New Mission, Media Mergers Raise Issues About Goals of U.S.
Antitrust Policy, S.F. DAILY J., Sept. 25, 1995, at 6.
8. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
9. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 2.26 (1994) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY]; Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)(alleged below-cost pricing not in
violation of Robinson Patman Act where recoupment unlikely).
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investments in fields other than intellectual property but with similar
risk.' ° These returns are partially a function of the strength of
intellectual property rights. Strength in copyright is a function of two
variables: the scope of copying that may be prohibited and the
duration of the prohibition. Under present market conditions,
software evolves very rapidly. Thus for most software the duration of a
copyright (presently the shorter of 100 years from creation or 75 from
publication, for works for hire)" is essentially irrelevant past a fairly
short term; copyrights could last 100 years or 10 without affecting the
rate of return analysis very much. The scope of the copyright is more
important. If the scope is too broad, net investment in intellectual
property will decrease because the first firm to obtain a copyright will
be able to sue later entrants for infringement. If the idea of a spy
novel, for example, were itself copyrightable, there would be fewer spy
novels because the copyright owner could either prevent entry or
obtain a portion of the available returns for itself through licensing
(and the owner would be in a very strong position to negotiate the
license). Firms contemplating entry would have to account for the risk
of infringement or the necessity for paying royalties; either factor
would reduce the expected value of the investment, and thus the
likelihood that investment would occur.
Extremely weak protection presents the same risks. If a firm's
competitors can copy its software, and thus compete by offering
substitutes without incurring research and development costs, then
they will be able to undercut the firm's price and deny it a profit on its
work. In such a regime, investment in intellectual property will be
unattractive from an ex ante perspective. The risks of losing money
will be high, and the expected value of an investment in intellectual
property will therefore be low. This is a problem for both individual
firms and the public, for if the intellectual property laws provide
insufficient inducements for investment in that area, too little
intellectual property will be produced and the public will be among
the losers. The economic analysis necessary to accomplish copyright's
mission should be taken from the field of financial economics, which
examines, among other things, the relationship between risk and
return and the proper method for evaluating whether firms should
10. This number is the opportunity cost a firm incurs by investing in intellectual property
rather than the other field.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994).
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make investments. In reality this is almost never the case in published
opinions and far too rarely the case in the academic literature.' 2
In general one might say that antitrust's mission is to see that the
market operates freely, while copyright seeks to provoke a particular
response from the market. Claims at the intersection of antitrust and
copyright thus raise complex legal and economic issues, which have
been addressed by only a few courts, constrained by the unclear
contours of antitrust and the perhaps overly clear contours of the
Copyright Act. From a policy perspective, the principal problem is to
ascertain the mix of antitrust, copyright, and other legal principles that
best enhances competition and innovation in software markets, and
thus best promotes consumer welfare. This requires an understanding
of the relationship between the scope of copyright protection and
investment in the production of copyrighted works, as well as an
understanding of the capacity and limitations of antitrust to efficiently
monitor the exercise of economic power of any kind, including such
power as is conferred by copyright.
This article discusses these issues and identifies the economic
variables that courts should examine in evaluating antitrust essential
facilities claims in the software context. This article concludes that
antitrust in general, and the essential facilities doctrine in particular, is
ill-suited to the task of policing the power of software copyrights.
While many of the claims that have been brought raise legitimate legal
and economic issues, they are primarily distributional issues relating to
the optimal incentive structure for the promotion of investment in
intellectual property. Because those issues must be resolved based
upon the scope of power conferred by a copyright, they must be
addressed by the copyright laws using the tools of financial economics;
antitrust (and price theory) does not provide the analytical tools
necessary to accomplish this task.
Part I of the article presents three situations in which the issue has
arisen, describing the basic economic factors at work and the claims
parties have made. Part II discusses the emergence of the essential
facilities doctrine from the antitrust mists, and attempts to distill its
animating principles from the few cases where such a claim has
prevailed. Part III outlines the scope of a copyright grant in the
software context, including the economic principles pertinent to these
situations, and discusses the application of the essential facilities
doctrine in software markets.
12. For a notable and welcome exception, See Fisher, Fair Use, supra note 2, at 1698-1705.
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I
The Nature of the Problem:
Competition, Synergy, and Strategic Behavior
Most of the basic problems we are concerned with here can be
seen by examining three hypothetical cases in which the elements of
competition, synergy, and strategic behavior arise. The first case
involves a dispute between parties (most likely competitors) who have
no contractual relationship. One party requires access to copyrighted
software code developed by the other in order to develop a product or
provide a service. Cases of this nature include some reverse-
engineering cases, in which software manufacturers seek access
(through limited copying) to code written by their competitors in
order to write programs compatible with their competitors' systems.
Accolade's reverse engineering of Sega's code in order to write
programs for games that would run on Sega's game consoles is an
example of this type of case.' Similar concerns arise when a firm seeks
access to copyrighted material in order to provide some service, such
as computer repair. Grumman's efforts to obtain copies (by means
somewhat older and less refined than reverse engineering) of Data
General's diagnostic software, 4 and Peak Computer's similar efforts
to make copies of MAI's software 5 are examples of this variation on
the problem.
The second type of case is characterized by a dispute between
parties to an existing contractual licensing relationship, with attendant
reciprocal rights, obligations, and expectations. For example, suppose
a firm ("A") produces a home banking program. In order to enhance
the value of its program, A licenses portions of its code to other firms
(firms "C") that make software that allows consumers to customize
the application program to their particular needs by adding features a
customer wants such as calculating hedges, monitoring the Eurobond
market, etc. This licensing arrangement carries obvious potential
reciprocal benefits for the parties: the ability to purchase customized
software will make the basic home banking program more attractive to
consumers, while any growth in the market share of the basic program
will make the license more valuable to C.
13. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
14. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
15. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed,
510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
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But while both programs in this hypothetical are more valuable
together than they would be separately, the power structure of the
relationship may be asymmetric, depending on consumer preferences
and the costs of developing the different types of software. Suppose
the basic application program was costly to develop, and consumers
derived a large portion of the utility of the combined programs from
the application program itself. In this case, A might have exploitable
leverage over C, particularly if A's application program obtains a large
market share and modifying C's program to work with competing
programs (or of developing application software to support the
customized program) is costly. C's cost of modifying its program to
work with an application program with a smaller market share, as well
as the opportunity cost of not selling in the larger market, will be
referred to as C's "switching costs." Under such conditions, A may be
able to extract benefits from C based in part on the value C has added
to A's program. If A and C have a three-year license, A should be able
to obtain fees and/or concessions in an amount slightly less than C's
switching costs when negotiating an extension of the license. This
example is not problematic, reflecting merely the risks inherent in any
contractual relationship involving uncertainty over a given term.16
Problems may arise, however, if A seeks to renegotiate its license in
mid-term.'
Part of the leverage potentially available to parties in the second
type of case stems from the economic phenomenon at the heart of the
third case-network effects. A market is characterized by network
effects if "the utility that a user derives from consumption of a good
increases with the number of other agents consuming the good."' 8 A
few common examples of network effects markets, dicussed in greater
detail below, should assuage any present economic anxiety brought on
by the term: telephones are more valuable to existing owners when
additional consumers buy phones because such purchases increase the
number of people with whom each existing user may communicate.
16. The same problem could arise, for example, in the lease of a commercial property of
uncertain value. Should the lessee establish a valuable business (say, an espresso bar next to a
law school), it is exposed to a risk that its lease will not be renewed because the lessor wants to
establish a similar business on the same site.
17. These two examples should be seen as points on a continuum ranging from competitive
parties with no previous contractual relationship to parties with longstanding contractual ties in
which one party engages in opportunistic behavior.
18. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
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The same is true of fax machines, language itself, and many other
things. Such markets may require a degree of technical standardization
because fax machines and telephones may connect with each other
only if each operates on the same standard.
Some fear that network effects will reduce social welfare by
locking consumers into an inferior technology simply because so many
people have chosen to use it-a phenomenon known as "tipping."
Switching costs play a major role here, too, because existing users will
incur costs (likely opportunity costs, but it doesn't matter) up to the
point at which investment in new technology, both in terms of
purchasing the technology and training employees how to use it,
becomes profitable. The importance to antitrust is the fear that, if our
hypothetical firm A succeeds in getting its software adopted as a
standard, it might be resistant if not immune to competition from
other standards due to the extent of its network. Entry will be more
difficult because a large installed base of users is an inherent
advantage of an existing system, regardless of its relative shortcomings
when compared to other systems. Given the difficulty of dislodging a
market standard, supply may be inelastic in network effects markets
(relative to the elasticities that would apply to the technology without
the network effect), and a given A firm may have some leeway to
charge supracompetitive prices without fear of attracting entry. Other
common fears are that a firm will: use power in a network effects
market to leverage its way into other markets; charge predatory prices
for some systems in order to lock consumers into a network effects
aftermarket; and rely on the network effects to recoup predatory
losses.
These three hypothetical cases represent points on a continuum
of problems concerning competition in markets involving intellectual
property rights, network effects, and strategic behavior. There are
many other combinations, and the analysis will depend on the
characteristics of the market in each case. The intersection of antitrust
and intellectual property is challenging, and the economic implications
of network effects are not yet fully understood. Therefore, the task of
reconciling the various interests involved to enhance social welfare
requires a cautious, disinterested analysis rooted in the economic facts
of each case. The theoretical framework necessary to interpret those
facts requires a similarly disinterested analysis. Insofar as the essential
facilities doctrine is concerned, developing such a framework is the
subject of the following sections.
[Vol. 18:771
REGULATING COMPETITION IN THE INFORMATION AGE
II
The Curious History of the Essential Facilities Doctrine
The late Professor Areeda termed the essential facilities doctrine
"an epithet in need of limiting principles."'19 Professor Hovenkamp
concurs, casting the doctrine as "one of the most troublesome,
incoherent and unmanageable bases for Sherman § 2 liability" and
concluding that "[t]he antitrust world would almost certainly be a
better place if it were jettisoned, with a little fine tuning of the general
doctrine of the monopolist's refusal to deal to fill in the resulting
gaps."' Even these appraisals, coming from thoughtful commentators
who could hardly be accused of slavish devotion to Chicago, may be
too kind.
More than an epithet, the essential facilities doctrine embodies
some of the most unfortunate tendencies of antitrust. Most prominent
among these is antitrust's tendency to identify an economic state of
affairs and, either wrongly perceiving the state of affairs to be a
legitimate antitrust problem or wrongly perceiving it to be ubiquitous,
to endorse broad principles far exceeding any justifiable remedial
purpose, condemning innocuous or procompetitive practices in the
process. The black letter of an essential facilities claim, such as it is, is
best stated in MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.:
The case law sets forth four elements necessary to establish liability
under the essential facilities doctrine: (1) control of the essential
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use
of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility.
21
The most important of these elements is the second-whether a
competitor may duplicate the "facility" in question.' The doctrine has
its origin in a case dealing with a natural monopoly and is out of place
in any circumstance where the uncommon economic characteristics of
such monopolies are not present.23 There is little if anything to
recommend the doctrine as a tool for regulating competition in the
software industry.
19. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990).
20. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 9, § 7.7.
21. 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
22. In most cases defining the facility is fairly easy; in software markets, however, more
difficult questions arise. These are discussed in Part III.
23. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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We will examine four cases: United States v. Terminal Railroad
Association,' the case commonly cited as the origin of the doctrine;
25
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,2 which represents a rare
justifiable use of the doctrine;' Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp. ;28 and, though it was not itself an essential facilities case,
the Supreme Court's opinion in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.,' which opened the door to many of the
essential facilities cases brought today.
A. Natural Monopoly: Terminal Railroad and Otter Tail
We begin with some rudimentary economics, which are necessary
to understand the logic and limitations of the essential facilities
doctrine, and also to understand the complex economics of the
software industry. A firm's size is determined by the cost
characteristics of its particular industry: in competitive markets firms
will maintain the minimum efficient size that will capture all relevant
scale economies. If it costs $1,000 to establish a widget-making firm,
and each widget costs $1 to make, the cost of producing one widget is
$1,001, which is what the firm must charge to recoup its costs; the cost
of producing 1,000 widgets is $2.00 each.' If the widget market can
absorb one million widgets per year, and each widget firm can produce
100,000 widgets per year at a per-widget cost of $1, then ten widget
firms will satisfy the market demand. If a widget firm could produce
500,000 widgets per year at the same per-widget cost, the market
would have room for no more than two firms; the total cost per widget
would be lower with two firms than with ten because the initial $1,000
cost would be spread across more units.31
Similarly, if a firm could make one million widgets per year at the
same per-widget cost, it would satisfy the entire market demand at the
lowest cost, creating a "natural monopoly," a state in which a single
firm can satisfy demand in the relevant market at a lower unit cost
24. Id.
25. Areeda, supra note 19, at 842.
26. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
27. Areeda, supra note 19, at 847.
28. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
29. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
30. We here speak of economic cost, which includes a competitive return on investment,
rather than out-of-pocket cost.
31. For a more detailed, and only slightly more technical, discussion of these points, see
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 9, at § 1.4a.
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than two or more firms.2 Typical examples include local electric
power and gas distribution,33 local telephone service,' and, perhaps,
long-distance transportation of petroleum and gas by pipeline.35 The
problem arising from such markets is easy to state: "[I]f the market is
occupied by a single firm, the firm will charge a monopoly price. If it is
occupied by multiple firms, even assuming that the firms behave
competitively, they will have higher costs and charge higher prices."'
As these examples bring to mind, natural monopolies are commonly
controlled through governmental regulation of their prices, which is
designed to provide firms in such markets with a competitive (rather
than supracompetitive) return.'
Because a natural monopoly market will by definition support
only one producer, other producers cannot compete in the usual
way-by attempting to provide substitute goods or services-because
the market will not support two or more firms operating at minimum
efficient size. This can create problems for firms that need to deal with
natural monopoly markets. For example, almost all firms, from law
firms to barber shops, use electricity as an element of production. But
no firm could realistically integrate backwards into the production
and/or distribution of electricity, nor induce entry into such markets,
because the cost structure in those markets would not support more
than one firm even if entry were otherwise feasible. Firms would thus
potentially be at the mercy of the electric company, which is one
reason why rates in such markets historically have been regulated.
The essential facilities doctrine is commonly held to originate
with the Terminal Railroad case,' which involved a group of railroads
that joined together to purchase the only terminal facilities serving St.
32. E.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 482
(2d ed. 1980).
33. Id.
34. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 891 (1983).
35. SCHERER, supra note 32.
36. See HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 9, at § 1.4b.
37. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission sets prices for interstate sales
of electricity based on the return required by investors to hold securities with risks comparable to
the risk of the utility's stock. This in turn requires a discounted cash flow analysis on a firm-by-
firm basis. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 54
(1991); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) ("the returns
to the equity owner [of a regulated business] should be commensurate with returns on
investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.").
38. Areeda, supra note 19, at 842.
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Louis.39 The Court apparently concluded in substance that the facility
was a natural monopoly, and thus ordered that competitors of the
members of the purchasing group be given access to the terminal on a
nondiscriminatory basis.' This order may have merely rearranged the
deck chairs on the Titanic; it required the defendants to share their
monopoly profits with their competitors, but did nothing directly to
prevent the extraction of such profits from consumers.41 Of course, the
Court's options were limited. It could not have undertaken the
legislative task of regulating the terminal's returns, which would have
required inquiries into the cost of capital and other, similarly complex
and similarly empirical matters. It may be that forcing the defendants
to share their monopoly rents with their competitors had some
benefit,42 though (keeping in mind that in natural monopoly markets
one firm can operate at lower cost than several) such an order could in
theory simply have raised the costs of running (and thus using) the
facility.
Over time, the Court added additional support for the essential
facilities idea,43 most notably in Otter Tail, in which a firm that
generated power (in that case a competitive market) also held a
natural monopoly over the long-distance transmission of power
(known as "wheeling") in the relevant geographic market.' A few
small cities in the market wished to sell electricity at retail to their
residents, and thus asked Otter Tail either to sell power at wholesale
to them or to wheel wholesale power generated by other firms;45 either
39. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. at 383.
40. Areeda, supra note 19, at 842.
41. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 208 (1976) ("It is
difficult to understand how [the decree in Terminal Railroad] protects the public; its purpose and
effect are, rather, to let the defendants' competitors share in the monopoly position enjoyed by
the defendants.").
42. Professor Areeda appears to defend the opinion on this ground, stating that "the
Supreme Court wisely concluded that the most efficient remedy was to admit nonmember
competitors to the consortium." Areeda, supra note 19, at 842. This conclusion is not inescapable.
To the extent that consumers were investors, for example, they might have recouped some of
their losses in the form of an increase in the plaintiffs' stock price. As argued in more detail
below, modern portfolio theory and the ability of consumers inexpensively to diversify their
holdings suggests that the allocation of wealth, including monopoly rents, will even out over time
and among firms as a whole, lessening the force of any arguments for the use of antitrust as a
distributive vehicle. Such considerations may well have had less force in 1912, when capital
markets were arguably less efficient and diversification more difficult; nevertheless, it does not
follow that a distributional remedy was appropriate.
43. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 366.
44. Id. at 368.
45. Id. at 370.
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option would have increased competition for consumers in the retail
power market. Otter Tail, whose prices for wheeling were subject to
federal regulation, used its natural monopoly over the power lines to
ensure an effective monopoly in the unregulated retail market. 6
Though the Court did not invoke the essential facilities doctrine as
such, it held that the refusal to sell power to the cities or wheel power
from other firms violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.47
Four aspects of Otter Tail are worth noting. First, it expanded the
essential facilities concept from coordinated conduct among many
firms, which characterized Terminal Railroad, to the unilateral activity
of a single firm. This is important because coordinated conduct among
firms poses greater dangers of anticompetitive conduct, and a lower
risk of anticompetitive rulings from the courts, than does conduct by a
single firm. Because single-firm conduct, including refusals to deal
with competitors, is ubiquitous, the implications of applying the
essential facilities theory to such conduct are far greater than in the
Terminal Railroad context. 8 Second, Otter Tail's power transmission
lines were a natural monopoly, and the case thus does not expand the
scope of Terminal Railroad with respect to issues of market power or
supply elasticity.49 Third, Otter Tail was subject to extensive federal
regulation of its dealings, including its prices, with other firms;' the
Court's order that it was required to deal with them thus shifted the
debate into a forum in which rates of return could (at least in theory)
be regulated.51 Fourth, Otter Tail attempted to use a natural
monopoly over one market (wheeling) to retain a monopoly (but not a
natural monopoly) in another (retail sales of power).52 The Court's
opinion thus condemned the use of natural monopoly power to create
what Judge Easterbrook has aptly called "bottlenecks" in competitive
processes.53
46. Id. at 371.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Professor Areeda discusses this point in greater detail in Areeda, supra note 19, at 849.
49. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 369.
50. Id. at 371.
51. For a discussion of these aspects of the Otter Tail opinion, see Areeda, supra note 19, at
848; Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 571 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
52. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 368-71.
53. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 573 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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B. Potential Doctrinal Expansion: Aspen Skiing and Kodak
Although both Terminal Railroad and Otter Tail were natural
monopoly cases, to some members of the antitrust bar they simply
invited firms to demand, with occasional success, access to assets
owned by the firm's competitors to compete more effectively. Such
enticing fruit was too much for some firms to resist, resulting in a crop
of odd claims aptly summarized by Professor Areeda as including:
a rock impresario seeking admission to the local auditorium; a
teletype machine marketer complaining that its competitor will not
sell machines for it; a ski resort complaining that a rival will not
engage in joint marketing with it; a maker of "muscle building" food
supplements demanding that a body building magazine accept its
ads; a paper retailer complaining that other paper retailers will not
admit it to their wholesale buying co-op; an anesthesiologist insisting
that the local hospital, using in-house anesthesiologists, allow him to
perform anesthesiological services as well; or the would-be oil seller,
who has no storage tanks of his own, demanding to use those of an
incumbent seller-to say nothing of Berky, who wants to know the
results of Kodak's research before Kodak markets its own
innovations.
54
To this list we may now add: Alaska Airlines, which wants less
expensive access to reservations systems run by American and
United;55 TV Communications Network, which views ESPN and TNT
as essential to its efforts to sell cable television subscriptions in
Denver; 56 and Dr. Tarabishi, whose staff privileges at the McAlester
Regional Hospital are equally essential.57
Anecdote is no substitute for analysis. Still, it is difficult to resist
the conclusion that those aspects of the doctrine which spawned this
lot of cases should have been discarded long ago. Antitrust has a way
of preserving such theories, particularly when they are malleable
enough to fit a variety of sympathetic factual scenarios. This may
explain the unfortunate appearance of Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp.8 in the essential facilities line and, quite
improbably, in software essential facilities claims. In these instances
54. Areeda, supra note 19, at 843-44 (citations omitted).
55. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 977 (1992).
56. TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 964 F.2d 1022
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 999 (1992); TV Communications Network Inc. v. ESPN,
Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Colo. 1991).
57. Tarabishi v. McAlester Reg'l Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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the opinion has been said by plaintiffs to justify the use of the essential
facilities doctrine to compel cooperation by a monopolist with a
competitor.59 From the perspective of the Court's actual opinion, there
are two problems with such invocation: the Court did not address the
essential facilities rationale, and the defendant was almost certainly
not a monopolist.
Defendant Aspen Skiing Company owned three of four ski
mountains in Aspen Colorado; plaintiff Aspen Highlands owned the
fourth.' For 15 years the two companies had offered some form of
cooperative ski ticket, which allowed consumers to ski at the
mountains of either firm by buying the same ticket.6' Consumers
preferred such packages, which gave them daily flexibility in choosing
mountains to ski without having to purchase tickets (and stand in
lines) each day.' Aspen then ceased its cooperation and refused to
offer joint tickets.' This did not mortally wound Aspen Highland,
though it felt relegated to "a day ski area in a destination resort"' and
lost some revenue.' Nevertheless, Aspen Highlands sued, claiming
that Aspen was a monopolist and that (i) its mountains (in the form of
Aspen's participation in the joint ticket program) were an essential
facility, without access to which Highland's competitiveness was
diminished, and (ii) Aspen's refusal to cooperate with Highlands in
offering the joint ticket was willful maintenance of monopoly power,
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act."'
The Court did not reach the essential facilities issue because it
found ample evidence to support the jury's verdict on the plaintiff's
section 2 claim.67 The section 2 claim in turn was lost largely because
Aspen did not challenge the jury's finding that it was a monopolist.'
This was a mistake: Aspen was a "destination resort,"' meaning its
customers came long distances to ski there; they could just as easily
have gone to Snowbird, Steamboat Springs, Jackson Hole, or any of a
59. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994).
60. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 593.
61. Id. at 589-93.
62. Id. at 589.
63. Id. at 593.
64. Id. at 594 (citation omitted).
65. Id.
66. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 595-96.
67. Id. at 611 n.44.
68. Id. at 596.
69. Id. at 587.
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number of resorts in the Rocky Mountains. Aspen competed with such
resorts regardless of its arrangement with Highland. It is thus highly
improbable that Aspen had a monopoly in any properly defined
market.70 This fact made writing a monopolization opinion difficult,
and severely distorted the usefulness of the opinion in future cases.
The worst problem was that the alleged wrongful conduct was
Aspen's refusal to cooperate with its competitor for the competitor's
benefit. Although it would be hard to design a study to provide
confirmation, both theory and intuition suggest that such conduct is
almost always procompetitive. Among other things, such refusals
allow firms to preserve the returns of their investments for their
investors; the ability to exclude those who did not invest from sharing
in such returns leaves more for the actual investors and thus increases
the likelihood of investment in general. This is a key concept in
copyright as well. As noted above, the copyright laws are designed to
promote innovation, and innovation requires investment, which
requires that investors be assured a competitive return. 71 Hence the
appearance of Aspen Skiing in copyright disputes is a dangerous
development from both the antitrust and the copyright perspectives.
Because Aspen was not a monopolist, and the behavior at issue is
generally procompetitive, it was difficult for the Court to write an
opinion that did not provide significant comfort to firms looking to file
antitrust suits attacking their competitors' procompetitive conduct.
The Court's opinion, which stresses Aspen's history of cooperation
with Highlands, and sustains a jury verdict based on the cessation of
such cooperation, does just that. The Court's emphasis on cooperation
was unfortunate. Counsel advising clients on antitrust issues have little
choice but to warn that once cooperation is begun antitrust may be
invoked as, in Professor Areeda's felicitous words, "an antidivorce
statute. 7  Thus, in support of its antitrust counterclaim to DG's
70. The problem originated in the trial court, which instructed the jury that it could find
both a relevant market and a relevant sub-market. "Thus instructed, the jury found that the
market was downhill skiing at North American destination ski resorts and that the submarket
was downhill skiing at Aspen. This ignores the critical issue: Which market did the defendant
need to control in order to be able to successfully charge monopoly prices?" Philip Areeda,
Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 979-
80 (1987).
71. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases,
and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1026
(1993) (arguing that copyright protects returns on investments in creative works as method of
promoting innovation); Fisher, Fair Use, supra note 2, at 1687.
72. Areeda, supra note 19, at 850.
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copyright action in Data General, Grumman could plausibly cite
Aspen Skiing for the contention that a "monopolist that has helped a
market to develop may not withdraw its support without legitimate
business justification."' All this is troubling because there are many
areas, particularly research and development, in which cooperation
among firms is desirable. At some point, most cooperative
undertakings will cease, and the firms will go their separate ways. Such
cooperation (and its termination) is generally structured through
contracts, most often express but possibly implied through conduct.
Contract, rather than antitrust, would seem to be the proper
repository of any antidivorce principles. If the parties' relationship did
not amount to an implied agreement, it is hard to see why antitrust
should be invoked.
Had Aspen actually been a monopolist, the Court's opinion might
have been of some use.74 As it is, one is left with the conviction that
antitrust would have been better off if the Court had used its power to
dismiss the grant of certiorari as improvident-little if anything useful
would have been lost and much confusion avoided. This is particularly
so in light of the Court's later opinion in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services.75 This case is perhaps most responsible for the
movement to infuse intellectual property disputes with antitrust
principles. Kodak is worthy of extended discussion here for two
reasons. First, the opinion held that "aftermarkets" (markets for goods
or services related to only one product) were legitimate markets in
which to allege an antitrust violation.76 Second, the Court articulated a
theory that is significant for intellectual property cases and has been
73. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188.
74. In particular, true monopoly power combined with the possible exclusionary effect of
refusing to recognize tickets sold by Highlands, which Professor Areeda considers a possible
form of exclusive dealing, might have justified the Court's result. Areeda, supra note 19, at 850.
Absent monopoly power, this theory has little appeal. From the practitioner's perspective, one
can only pray the Court to write no more opinions based on an assumption of monopoly power
where no such power has been shown to exist, regardless of the mistakes of counsel on appeal.
Law operates by analogy, albeit imperfectly, and sometimes by extremely bad analogy.
Nevertheless, when counsel has a client who is not a monopolist, and is cited to a monopoly
opinion that an opponent argues is analogous to the case at hand, counsel should be able to
identify for the court all the competitive constraints operating upon the client that were
ineffective in the case of the monopolist. This requires a comparison of facts. The problem, of
course, is that if the firm in the cited precedent was not a monopolist it may well have been
subject to constraints similar to the ones operating upon the client, and economically valid points
of distinction will be legal failures.
75. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
76. Id. at 481.
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aptly described by Professor Shapiro as "installed based
opportunism."'
Plaintiffs in Kodak were independent service organizations
(ISOs)78 that provided service for copiers manufactured by Kodak.
They were independent because they were not affiliated with Kodak,
which offered service for its copiers itself. 9 The ISOs charged less for
service than Kodak, which responded by implementing a policy of
selling replacement parts only to consumers who purchased its service
as well as its machines. I Kodak also persuaded the manufacturers of
these parts not to sell parts that fit Kodak machines to anyone other
than Kodak.81 This made it difficult if not impossible for ISOs to
obtain parts and thus to service Kodak machines. 2 Some ISOs were
forced out of business, and some lost significant revenues.
83
The ISOs sued, claiming that there were three markets involved
in the sale of Kodak copiers: the primary market for the copiers
themselves, in which Kodak competed with other manufacturers; a
market for parts for Kodak copiers; and a market for servicing Kodak
copiers.' As the case stood before the Court, the ISOs had conceded
that the primary market was competitive.' Nevertheless, the ISOs
claimed that Kodak had a monopoly in the market for parts for its
copiers, and that it had tied service for Kodak copiers to sales of
Kodak parts. 6 The parts monopoly presumably existed because
Kodak parts were not interchangeable with its competitors' parts; only
parts that fit Kodak machines could be used to repair Kodak
77. Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 487 (1995) ("The equipment manufacturer can engage in ex poste
exploitation of locked in buyers, also called installed-based opportunism, by making unexpected
changes in aftermarket policies that exclude aftermarket rivals and thus allow the manufacturer
to extract more money from locked-in buyers who have already purchased its equipment.")
[herinafter Shapiro, Aftermarkets].
78. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 455.
79. Id. at 457.




84. Id. at 457. The Court agreed that three such markets existed, relying on a test
articulated in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984), under
which separate markets exist if there is sufficient consumer demand for the products to be sold
separately. This test is unobjectionable in and of itself, but one must apply it carefully, with an
eye toward the consumer welfare goals of the antitrust laws.
85. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 465 n.10.
86. Id. at 459.
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machines.' This "monopoly" was created by Kodak's development of
the machines, including their component parts. Kodak could
manufacture the parts, or provide the necessary specifications to
manufacturing firms, as efficiency dictated. As Justice Scalia pointed
out in dissent, in this sense, Kodak's monopoly over parts was the
same as the monopoly of every durable goods manufacturer over parts
for its machines.' Volvo has the same monopoly over its crankshafts.'
This sensible point provoked a disturbing footnote from the majority,
which invoked the leverage theory of tying in response, 9° citing a series
of erroneous tying opinions with approval to magnify the damage
done. 91 Equally troubling, the majority indulged in the use of market
share as a proxy for monopoly power, finding that "Kodak controls
nearly 100% of the parts market . . .with no readily available
substitutes . . . ." The insight that the owner of a Kodak copier has
87. Id. at 482.
88. Id. at 489.
89. As Professor Hovenkamp said, "[K]odak, like most other manufacturers of durable
goods subject to repair, has a great deal of control over the manufacturing of its own repair parts
and ... its own repair parts are the only ones that will fit in its machines." Herbert
Hovenkamp, Market Power Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the Kodak Case, 40 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1447, 1454-55 (1993) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Aftermarkets].
90. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29. The Chicago School has long argued that a monopolist has
a fixed quantum of monopoly power, which cannot be magnified by allocating it between
markets through a tie. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 372-75 (1993); see also HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 9, § 7.6 (arguing
that leverage theory of tying is dubious basis for antitrust).
Professor Kaplow argues that it may be possible for a monopolist to increase the profits of
its power by leveraging itself into a more profitable market-for example one characterized by
network effects or protected by intellectual property rights. See Louis Kaplow, Extension of
Monopoly Power Through Leveraging, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515-16 (1985). This is less of a
concern in connection with aftermarkets because any social welfare loss in an aftermarket is
strictly constrained by the primary market share of the aftermarket monopolist. If the primary
market is competitive, as it was conceded to be in Kodak, leveraging does not present a coherent
theory of social welfare loss. At the aftermarket level, leveraging concerns are primarily
distributional, and thus present a weaker case for invoking antitrust.
91. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 479-80 n.29. The opinions on which the majority relied include
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 402 (1947) (affirming summary judgment
against a defendant leasing salt processing machines with a requirement that the lessee also buy
salt, without inquiring whether the defendant held market power in any market), and Northern
Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 12 (1958) (affirming judgment against a
defendant that sold land along its right of way on condition that the purchasers ship over its lines
without considering that the defendant could not have had power in the market for land for
manufacturing purposes).
92. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481. The endorsement of market share as a proxy is unfortunate
because even a firm with 100% of a market may not have market power, depending on
elasticities of supply and demand. See, e.g., Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d
1422, 1425-26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1197 (1993).
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no readily available substitutes for parts that fit Kodak copiers does
little to advance any meaningful conception of antitrust policy. As
Professor Hovenkamp put it, such factors "are, by themselves,
absolutely irrelevant to the manufacturer's power in aftermarkets."
93
By focusing on parts and service as such, the Court adopted the
ISOs' perspective, which is to say the perspective of a competitor,
rather than the perspective of the actual consumers at issue-
purchasers of Kodak copiers. As a result, the opinion fails to come to
grips with the fundamental fact that consumers had no desire for
Kodak parts or service as such; they had a desire for copies. Parts and
service are demanded only to the extent necessary to keep the copier
in good enough repair to produce copies. Thus, assuming for the
moment that Kodak charged "supracompetitive" prices for service,
consumers would view such prices as part of the overall cost of
obtaining copies, not in isolation. If Kodak service cost $25,000 more
than ISO service over the life of the copier, which itself cost $500,000,
the overcharge to the consumer is 5%.94 This may or may not be a
material sum to the purchaser; it may mean life or death to the ISO.
Nevertheless, the 5% overcharge would be all that is of concern to
antitrust because that is all that is relevant to consumers. As
importantly, this approach focuses on the market in which Kodak was
forced to live: the primary, competitive market for copiers. There is
little demand for either service or parts for Kodak copiers if Kodak's
fortunes in this market sag.
In response to Kodak's argument that the competitive primary
market prevented it from exercising market power in the aftermarkets
for parts and service because consumers would then purchase its
competitors' machines, the Court seized on what it assumed were
"market imperfections" in the primary market: switching costs and
information costsY As this is the aspect of Kodak analogous to the
software debate, the Court's analysis deserves close attention.
The Court's switching costs rationale was simple: existing owners
of Kodak copiers would have to, among other things, incur some
expense to dispose of those copiers, obtain new ones from a different
manufacturer, integrate the new system into their business, and retrain
93. Hovenkamp, Aftermarkets, supra note 89, at 1454.
94. Professor Hovenkamp makes this point as well. See Hovenkamp, Aftermarkets, supra
note 89, at 1456-57.
95. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473.
[Vol. 18:771
REGULATING COMPETITION IN THE INFORMATION AGE
staff.' Kodak could theoretically charge some amount slightly below
that cost, but well above its marginal cost, for service, thus earning
supracompetitive revenues (assuming Kodak's marginal costs were
comparable to the ISO costs)97 without losing any customers. 8 This
point is correct but limited. Kodak could only earn such revenues from
existing customers, and in particular those whose machines were not
near the end of their useful lives (and thus in the market for a new
copier). As Kodak rightly argued, however, doing so would be a
"short-run game."'  Future purchasers would likely learn of its
opportunistic behavior (though the rate at which this information
would be disseminated is an empirical matter that could vary among
markets) and take steps to prevent it, including buying from other
firms in the competitive primary market, thereby limiting Kodak's
"power" to extract supracompetitive profits to the life of one machine.
This, however, is not a complete response to the switching costs
argument. If nothing else, when Kodak eventually decides to exit the
market there will be an end-period problem in which the company's
concerns for its reputation will act as less of a constraint on extracting
revenues from its installed base."i°
Although these factors do not provide conclusive answers for all
cases, they would likely ameliorate the harm to consumers in most
situations. And why the antitrust laws should be invoked to prevent
what is essentially contractual opportunism over the life of a single
product is not readily apparent, nor is any persuasive answer likely to
exist. As discussed below, contractual provisions might well take care
of a significant portion of the concern. Even if contractual provisions
could provide only imperfect protection, it is still not clear why the
antitrust laws should be applied to such a narrow problem. Perhaps
because of the limited scope of the switching costs argument, the
Court offered an additional theory of market failure, based on
96. Id. at 476.
97. This was a point of some debate. If, as Kodak contended, the ISOs were free-riding on
its investment in copiers, the ISOs presumably had a lower cost structure. In that case, Kodak's
higher rates would not necessarily reflect supracompetitive pricing. See id. at 483-86; see also
Hovenkamp, Aftermarkets, supra note 89, at 1455 n.32.
98. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473.
99. Id. at 470.
100. The constraint is not completely lost. If Kodak's copiers are replaced by a new
generation of technology that Kodak also manufactures and if (as we may reasonably assume if
the new generation technology is a substitute for the old) installed-base owners of Kodak copiers
will be prospective purchasers of the new technology, Kodak will still face a significant
reputational constraint. See Shapiro, Aftermarkets, supra note 77, at 490.
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supposedly prohibitive information costs.1 1 This was the crux of the
Court's reasoning from an antitrust policy perspective because it had
the potential to transform Kodak's policy from a short-run strategy of
contractual opportunism into a profitable general business practice
undisciplined by well-informed consumers purchasing in a competitive
market. The Court's theory was that "[l]ifecycle pricing of complex,
durable equipment is difficult and costly. In order to arrive at an
accurate price, a consumer must acquire a substantial amount of raw
data and undertake sophisticated analysis."1 The Court argued that
many consumers would be unwilling to incur such costs, and thus
would be vulnerable to ex post opportunism by Kodak. 1"
The lifecycle pricing idea was less of an insight than it might seem.
Large purchases inevitably involve complex cost calculations, whether
the consumer is aware of them or not. If payment is made over time,
interest expenses must be considered and the best option chosen from
available financing alternatives. Amortization and liquidation value
must be considered, which require consideration of secondary or scrap
markets and the selection of a terminal point for the investment.
Pricing the total cost of obtaining copies, which includes copier
parts and service, is no different. A rational consumer will seek such
information until the marginal expense incurred in obtaining it equals
any cost savings realized. A consumer may rationally choose not to
learn all the details of lifecycle pricing, which would in many cases
imply that the costs at issue were not material relative to the overall
cost of whatever system was at issue, and will factor any resulting
uncertainty into the decision to purchase. Either way, the lack of
perfect information in no way implies a market imperfection of a
sufficient magnitude to warrant the invocation of antitrust. One of the
main points of the Coase theorem is that information is quite often
imperfect;1" while this point implies that legal entitlements should be
allocated in such a way as to minimize the losses from bargains too
costly to strike, it does not even begin to follow that antitrust is
remotely capable of providing such a remedy, much less that it should
be applied in such cases. Many consumers fail to read the agreements
they sign for durable goods, and thus may find themselves victims of
unwelcome surprises at a later date. But this cannot plausibly serve as
101. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474.
102. Id. at 473.
103. Id. at 474-75.
104. R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988).
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a warrant for invoking antitrust. Not surprisingly, even defenders of
the Court's opinion find its information cost theory less than
compelling. Professor Fox, whose defense we will examine in a
moment, concedes that "[s]mall information failures or lags are garden
variety disorders of economic life. Consumers must take responsibility
to get information for themselves when the information matters to
them."'
As Kodak pointed out, its competitors would likely be more than
willing to provide consumers with such information if Kodak's prices
in the aftermarkets were too high.1" The Court wrongly discounted
this probability,"° but it is a detail either way. Even if consumers do
not have accurate price information, the conclusion that antitrust
should be invoked requires a further policy analysis the Court never
undertook.
105. Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc-Information
Failure or Soul As Hook? 62 ANTMIUST L.J. 759, 766 (1994).
106. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474.
107. The Court believed that
A competitor in the equipment market may not have reliable information about the
lifecycle costs of complex equipment it does not service or the needs of customers it
does not serve. Even if competitors had the relevant information, it is not clear that
their interests would be advanced by providing such information to consumers.
Id. (citation omitted). The former point is unlikely; a prudent purchaser could look to the sources
consumers look to every day for information on large purchases: current and former owners of
the equipment, trade publications, repeat players such as lenders who finance purchases, and
similar sources. See BORK, supra note 90, at 438 n.*. In fact, Kodak's problems with its
aftermarkets were sufficiently well-known to the industry for "[t]wo of the largest consumers of
service and parts" to submit briefs to the Court "contend[ing] that they are worse off when the
equipment manufacturer also controls service and parts." Kodak, 504 U.S. at 479, n.28. That
being the case, one would expect consumers to address any concerns at the time of purchase, an
option available to all but those who owned machines at the time Kodak's policy changed. As
discussed below, those are the only purchasers for whom the Court's concerns had any validity,
and their plight, though real, seems insufficient to warrant the intervention of antitrust. The
Court's latter point, that competitors might not provide information on lifecycle costs, Kodak,
504 U.S. at 474, is perplexing. The Court's basis for the statement was its concern that "[t]o
inform consumers about Kodak, the competitor must be willing to forgo the opportunity to reap
supracompetitive prices in its own service and parts markets." Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474, n.21. This
of course simply ignores the plaintiffs' concession that the primary market was competitive. The
Court is positing oligopolistic behavior, not a competitive market. See BORK, supra note 90, at 438
n.*. The Court was also worried that competitors would stay silent because informing customers
might lead Kodak to lower its prices, thus making its copiers more competitive. This suggestion
seems implausible at best. The Court posits a competitor willing to stand mute while a potential
customer decides between its products and those of a competitor for fear that trying to make the
particular sale at hand will lessen sales in the future. By parity of reasoning, one might expect the
firm to send all its customers to a competitor so as to fool the competitor into thinking it was a
monopolist. Once the duped faux monopolist raised its prices to monopoly levels, the firm could
then profitably undercut its competitor's prices.
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We may begin this analysis by examining the effect of Kodak's
policy, taking everything the ISOs alleged to be true. On such facts,
owners of Kodak machines pay more to Kodak for service than they
would in a competitive market, resulting in a material transfer of
wealth from copier consumers to Kodak and the elimination of ISOs
from the market. We may not infer, however, that wealth is
transferred in sufficient amounts to force consumers to discontinue
use of their copiers. Even as a monopolist, Kodak would likely not go
so far.18 As noted above, consumers' use of copiers, and whatever
such use adds to social welfare as a whole, is a function of the total
cost of obtaining copies, not of the costs of service or parts, which may
be a fairly small portion of the total cost even if that small portion is
all or nothing to the ISOs. It follows that the real concern in Kodak is
not so much with the deadweight loss that is the evil with which
antitrust is traditionally concerned, as it is with the transfer of wealth
from the copier owners to Kodak.' 9 In this respect, Kodak poses a
classic problem, more familiarly posed by the hypothetical of perfect
price discrimination, of whether antitrust is concerned with pure (or
close to pure) wealth transfers."0
Assuming the ISOs establish that Kodak's policy successfully
transferred wealth from Kodak's customers to Kodak, and assuming
little or no reduction in output, it is legitimate to question why this
should be an antitrust problem at all, particularly in light of the
108. Instead, Kodak would charge an amount slightly less than the maximum price a user
would be willing to pay while continuing to use the machine.
109. In normal circumstances, monopolists by definition "will operate in the elastic portion
of their demand curves." See POSNER, supra note 41, at 10. It is possible that by increasing the
price of service Kodak would induce customers to purchase less in the parts or service
aftermarkets by, for example, waiting longer between service calls. This is not a restriction on
output in the traditional sense. So long as Kodak sets prices to maximize its monopoly revenues,
it will not price high enough to induce consumers to leave their machines broken rather than
having them fixed. To the extent either parts or service costs are variable with the number of
copies made, monopoly pricing in the aftermarkets might induce substitution toward less
expensive copying methods. Depending on the viability of such substitution (cross-elasticity of
Kodak's copiers with available substitutes), this could be a legitimate theoretical concern if the
problem was systemic; that is to say, if the Court's claims of market failures due to information
costs were a persuasive warrant for invoking the antitrust laws. Because they are not, we again
deal with a problem limited to one group of owners for the maximum life of one copier. If there
are few substitutes for Kodak's machines, as the Court's opinion implies, Kodak, 504 U.S. at 456-
57 n.1, there is likely to be little if any substitution, and thus little if any social welfare loss.
110. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 256 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (explaining that in the transfer of wealth from consumers to
producers, producers "derive[] no clear gain" from a welfare point of view); PHILLIP AREEDA &
LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 57 (4th ed. 1988)(posing price discrimination problem).
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concession that the primary market was competitive. Consumers are,
among other things, investors. Diversified investors, which is to say
most investors, should be indifferent to the allocation of the sums at
issue. Over time and in the economy as a whole, winners and losers in
such allocative debates even out."' Employees, who are also investors
through pension plans and the like, would have greater firm-specific
interests, but as a general matter it would be impossible to know ex
ante which side of the dispute a given firm would fall on, and thus
impossible to give effect to this interest. Kodak's employees would
want their company to win, while the ISOs' employees would want the
ISOs to win. To the extent either employees or consumers are
investors, however, they would prefer the choice of the rule that
maximizes wealth as a whole, regardless of distribution. These
considerations, along with the likelihood that any deadweight loss in
Kodak would be small, weigh against invoking antitrust as a
redistributional tool.
The ISOs, of course, would take strong issue with this, insisting
that whatever abstract arguments one might choose to make about the
distribution of wealth and wealth transfers in general, the issue is one
of life and death to them, and their interest should not be ignored.
Without competitors, they would argue, there can be no
competition." Such arguments underlie Professor Fox's defense of
Kodak; as she sees it, Kodak "is a chink in the armor of the allocative
efficiency model. Through the slit in the armor shines the light of
legitimacy and justice: the right of well-performing firms, valued by
consumers, not to be cut out of markets by a firm with power.'
'1 13
Professor Fox believes this right is conferred by the Sherman Act and
is the true source of the opinion, rather than, as some have argued, a
sort of "post-Chicago" economic view of antitrust."4 From this
111. This is because, from an investor's perspective, proper diversification eliminates firm-
specific risk; such investors are concerned about the returns from a market portfolio of assets,
and thus favor rules that create wealth to rules that sacrifice some wealth for broader distribution
of the remainder. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 37, at 139 (discussing effects of
diversification). Similar considerations suggest that bondholders and other corporate creditors,
who presumably diversify their portfolios as well, would also prefer the wealth-maximizing rule.
112. Such concerns underlie Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 830
F.2d 1513, 1518 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 842 F.2d 1034 (1987), affd., 496 U.S. 543
(1990).
113. Fox, supra note 105, at 760.
114. Chicago's demise has in any event been greatly exaggerated. The analytical approach
associated with Chicago-looking to consumer welfare as the guiding principle of antitrust and
using economic theory as the guide-is now second nature to most thoughtful commentators,
judges, and practitioners of antitrust. Kodak is ironically perhaps the best proof of Chicago's
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perspective the Court's information cost theories proved merely that
the majority could identify an economic theory consistent with its
conclusions, not that the theory compelled them."
Professor Fox analogizes Kodak to a case decided by the Court of
Justice of the European Communities in which a cash register
manufacturer was found liable to a firm it originally licensed as a
distributor;"6 the firm also repaired cash registers and the
manufacturer supplied it with parts to do so."7 The manufacturer
eventually built up its own distribution network and offered a new
agreement to the distributor, which refused it because the margins
were too low." 8 The manufacturer found others willing to accept the
distribution contract and, not surprisingly, thereafter refused to supply
machines or spare parts to the original firm. 119 These acts, which of
course enhanced the value of the distribution agreement to the firm
that accepted it, were the basis of a suit by the original distributor. The
commission agreed that a cognizable market existed for spare parts'm
success. Had it been decided 20 years ago, the Court likely would have been satisfied with the
platitudes and hasty assumptions that characterized opinions such as United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), which condemned an agreement among small grocers to
develop and market private-label foods that was almost certainly procompetitive, and Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), which allowed a claim to
proceed on the theory that the defendant tied credit for prefabricated houses to the houses
themselves. That the Kodak Court felt compelled to articulate an economic justification for its
result, cast to some extent in the form of harm to consumers rather than competitors, is a major
improvement in antitrust for which Chicago deserves substantial credit. (It would admittedly
have been better if the Court's analysis had been more realistic, but the progress is welcome
nonetheless.) But Chicago never advocated static analysis, nor does it require analysts to turn a
blind eye to market facts; no one with even passing familiarity with Coase's work would contest
the point. Though some analysts working from a Chicago orientation may have relied too heavily
on theory, that is a defect in the application of theory, not the approach itself. Nobody is perfect,
and the sins of Chicago analysts (if sins there are) pale compared to what came before. The post-
Chicago movement is occasionally both ideological and overtly anti-theoretical, which ignores
the simple reality that without a rigorous, coherent theoretical basis for determining what
antitrust goals should be and how they are likely to be achieved, it is impossible to decide cases.
One is left with lengthy recitations of facts followed by a conclusion, with no theory to distinguish
significant from insignificant facts, nor to explain why the conclusion is justifiable in terms of
antitrust policy goals. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 299
(D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
115. Fox, supra note 105, at 760.
116. Id. at 762-66. The case was Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister A.B. v. Commission, 1979
E.C.R. 1869 [1978-1979] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 18524.
117. Fox, supra note 105, at 763.
118. Id.
119. Id. The manufacturer also prohibited its subsidiaries and other authorized dealers from
dealing with the original firm as well. Id.
120. Id. at 765.
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and that "a firm in a dominant position 'cannot deny its customers
freedom of choice.'V.21 From this and other cases Professor Fox
extrapolates the EC rule as being that a manufacturer must supply
spare parts to customary buyers so long as demand exists, unless the
manufacturer can demonstrate an "objective justification" for the
conduct;= enhancement of consumer welfare would qualify as such a
justification. 3 The important point to Professor Fox is that a claimant
need not cast its theory in terms of consumer welfare: in the case she
recounts "there was no legal need to argue that customer exploitation
would occur. Indeed, the facts unabashedly belied exploitation."' On
this point, at least, there would likely be wide agreement.
The overall argument lacks appeal, however. Officers and
employees of ISOs, like all officers and employees, devote their
earning power (human capital) to a single firm; they thus have
relatively larger portions of their overall capital invested in the firm
than do consumers and investors who own diversified portfolios.
Officers and employees are therefore interested in obtaining rulings
that maximize the value of their firm, even if the legal rule necessary
to achieve this goal would diminish the value of firms (and
investments in them) generally. This is so because their firm, and to
some extent its officers and employees, will enjoy all the benefits of
the wealth transfer while suffering only a very diffuse portion of the
overall loss in wealth.' Their interests thus conflict with the interests
of consumers and investors generally, just as the interests of corporate
managers in building empires (inefficient diversification at the firm
level) conflict with the interests of shareholders. From this perspective
the ISOs, like all competitors, cannot be considered faithful guardians
of antitrust's interest in systemic efficiency.' This being the case, it is
121. Id. at 764 (quoting [1979] E.C.R. at 1884). The Court of Justice ultimately disposed of
the case on unrelated grounds. Id. at 765.
122. Fox, supra note 105, at 765.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 766.
125. Even if the officers and employees did not see the benefits directly, as in the form of
raises or bonuses, they might see it in the form of a continuation of a firm that, absent the
invocation of antitrust to protect it, would have expired.
126. This conclusion isnot as drastic as it may seem. Professor Kauper, for example, a
former head of the Antitrust Division, has recommended curtailing the ability of competitors to
bring private actions under the antitrust laws. See Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper,
Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 596-98 (1991). A
note of caution is warranted in the context of this article, however; the empirical study on which
this conclusion was based did not include tying or essential facilities claims. Id. at 597.
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hard to understand why it would be beneficial to allow competitors to
bring suit without alleging harm to overall consumer welfare and to
require firms to defend each case on the merits by establishing an
objective justification for their conduct. Such a rule would, as Kodak
likely will, simply increase the number of cases in which an antitrust
violation is found though consumer welfare is not harmed (the judicial
equivalent of a "false positive" in statistics), while enormously
increasing the cost of litigation producing such findings.' z If anything,
one would hope the law would gravitate in the other direction,
imposing what Judge Easterbrook has referred to as "filters"' 18 to
attempt to weed out cases that seem unlikely as a class to enhance
consumer welfare. 9
There is no reason to believe that antitrust has a comparative
advantage in solving the problems the Kodak Court identified. It is
important to remember that antitrust is only one method of
controlling business behavior; most obviously, antitrust is an
alternative to market self-correction and governmental regulation. In
a proper analysis, antitrust should also be compared to other forms of
legal constraint. In order to apply antitrust faithfully to enhance
consumer welfare, we must ask if the benefits of applying antitrust to
any given situation (including expense from unjustifiable suits brought
in the hope that an unclear doctrine will be mistakenly applied, or a
clear doctrine expanded beyond the reaches of its logic, and the
likelihood of erroneous findings of liability) exceed the harm to the
economy avoided by such application."3 The harm in this analysis
should itself be discounted to the extent it can be ameliorated by other
legal rules. Thus, if a rule other than antitrust can potentially remedy
90% of the harm identified in a particular case, an antitrust court
127. Of course, if one conceives of the antitrust laws as in part contemplating wealth
transfers from consumers to competitors, as Professor Fox apparently does, such findings would
not be false positives. It would of course be more efficient to effect such transfers through
taxation or other more direct methods, but those might be politically unpalatable. On the other
hand, evidence that such wealth transfers not be obtained through more open devices would
seem to be an independent ground for opposing the relatively more obscure use of antitrust
rulings to effectuate such transfers.
128. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (1984).
129. Id.
130. Such costs include the likelihood that a given antitrust rule may be hard to apply, and
thus produce false positives (either unobjectionable conduct condemned or objectionable
conduct excused) and thereby deter unobjectionable business behavior.
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should be concerned with the question whether elimination of the
remaining 10% warrants the invocation of the antitrust laws. 131
This analysis is particularly important because many legal rules,
particularly contract, are an integral part of the operation of the
markets antitrust oversees. Examining the availability of alternative
legal remedies is, to this extent, simply an element of an appropriate
market analysis. Antitrust, with its treble damages, attorney's fees, and
the prospect of broad-ranging discovery into competitors' business
affairs, may operate as the equivalent of an attractive nuisance within
the law. As such, antitrust may induce firms to bring suits where no
objective claims exist, or to distort the operation of legal rules
ingrained in the operation of markets, such as contract, by granting
parties rights they could have bargained for but didn't.
Antitrust's principal competitor in Kodak is contract, which
seems a superior way of addressing the problems the Court identified.
Antitrust is neither designed to monitor the contractual relations of
particular parties nor capable of such monitoring.' The familiar
metaphors of antitrust as the constitution or "magna carta" of free
enterprise are apt in at least one respect: antitrust deals with the
economy as a whole, and with business practices in general, not with
opportunistic practices between particular firms. Yet when the
infirmities in the Court's analysis of information costs are recognized,
Kodak reduces (at worst) to a case of contractual opportunism: the
only parties likely to be harmed in a systemic way by Kodak's policies
were consumers who purchased Kodak machines before the policy
change was announced, and thus were locked into the Kodak
aftermarkets by primary market switching costs. 33 Such costs could
allow Kodak to extract higher prices for service than the consumers
would have paid had the ISOs been able to obtain parts. Though this
class of consumers could theoretically have remedied the problem
131. The harm to applying other legal doctrines, comprising the same factors described in
the preceding footnote, should similarly be weighed in this analysis.
132. Shapiro, Aftermarkets, supra note 77, at 496 ("Antitrust law is not a nimble policy
instrument for fine tuning relationships between manufacturers and customers in ways that
contracts cannot.").
133. Without crediting the Court's information cost analysis entirely, it is conceivable that
some firms would not inquire into Kodak's service pricing prior to purchasing a copier even after
Kodak's policy was announced. With respect to such firms, the policy question is whether
antitrust is properly used as a consumer protection statute (in essence compelling disclosure) to
protect such firms. As noted in the text, antitrust is not properly concerned with the distribution
of wealth, and this principle should foreclose any use of the antitrust laws to protect firms from
themselves.
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through ex ante contracting, by negotiating for service and parts as
part of the purchase of the copier, they would not have been able to
learn of Kodak's policy, and thus would have been less likely to
negotiate for such terms.
Kodak is in a position analogous to sailors who seek to
renegotiate their wages upward when the ship is at sea and the captain
cannot hire a replacement crew.13 Even if the captain agrees, contract
will disregard the renegotiated wage term and enforce the original
deal.135 Consumers locked into purchasing supracompetitive copier
service could seek relief under analogous contractual provisions, such
as the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing, in an effort to retain the
benefits they thought they had obtained through their bargain. Under
the relatively flexible and yet narrow principles of contract, such
plaintiffs may or may not win such cases, though if they did not even
have a valid contract claim the warrant for invoking antitrust would
seem weaker still. At any rate, the invocation of a doctrine designed to
deal with the particular contractual relations of particular parties
would seem superior in every respect to the invocation of antitrust by
the Kodak court."3
With respect to the Court's information cost argument, even
prospective purchasers who had no knowledge of Kodak's practices,
but were simply shrewd and worried about becoming victims of
opportunism in the future, would, as Professor Shapiro has rightly
noted, have an array of contractual bargaining strategies available to
protect themselves. These include moving the purchase of service from
the aftermarket to the primary market through the purchase of a
warranty with the copier, leasing instead of purchasing (thus reducing
the period available for opportunism), and negotiating the right to
134. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 110, at 97.
135. Id. at 97-98; See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding
renegotiated wage term unenforceable for lack of new consideration).
136. Indeed, the availability of contract as a superior remedy provides the true basis of the
considerable appeal of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486-502. Justice
Scalia began from the premise that if Kodak had bundled the copier, parts, and service ex ante,
there would have been no question that its conduct was legal. Id. at 490-91. This is true, but not,
as Justice Scalia argues, because there could have been no tie. If one accepts that copiers, parts,
and service are distinct antitrust markets, a tie is theoretically possible. Such bundling would,
however, unquestionably have cured any defects in consumers' information regarding the
lifecycle pricing of copiers-they would have priced for all three markets because buyers would
have been in all three markets simultaneously. This pricing would have taken place at the time of
the initial copier purchase, which occurred in the concededly competitive primary market. On
this point, see Lee v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 23 F.3d 14, 20 (1st. Cir. 1994) (noting
curative effect of ex ante disclosure).
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receive parts and service on the same terms offered to new copier
purchasers (i.e., most favored nation clauses).' Admittedly, not all
purchasers are shrewd, but antitrust can hardly remedy that problem.
And there must be some limits to the presumed shortcomings of the
reasoning power and negotiating acumen of consumers. No legal
doctrine short of explicit price regulation could protect consumers
from themselves.1" In particular, there is absolutely no reason to
believe that antitrust can do better than contract.139
Moreover, there is a serious reason to question whether
application of antitrust principles to these cases could solve the
problems antitrust ought to solve. Even if the ISOs remained players
in Kodak's aftermarkets, it does not follow that pricing in the
aftermarkets will be competitive. If Kodak uses its inevitably strong
position in its aftermarket to charge supracompetitive prices, which is
the ISOs' entire theory,1" it may well provide a price umbrella under
which the ISOs could price below Kodak but still at a
supracompetitive level. The ISOs' interests are served by charging the
highest price they can, not necessarily in pricing at marginal cost. In
markets with few ISOs, the ISOs would have no reason to undercut
Kodak's price more than a little. Is the difference between a 15%
overcharge and a 20% overcharge in the aftermarkets, when properly
accounted as only a portion of the total copier cost to the consumers,
worth invoking the antitrust laws, particularly when contract could
provide a substantial if not complete remedy to the problems the
Court identified?
137. See Shapiro, Aftermarkets, supra note 77, at 488-89.
138. And price regulation may simply substitute a political market for an economic market.
139. I have often heard the argument made that, whatever consumers should do in theory,
they simply do not price copiers such as Kodak's on a lifecycle basis, and therefore antitrust
must step in. Accepting the factual predicate as true for purposes of analysis, the conclusion that
antitrust should be invoked does not even begin to follow. There are good reasons why legal
penalties and incentives should be structured on an assumption of rational behavior. Among
other things, such structures make rational behavior a superior strategy to irrational behavior.
More pragmatically, consumers may often (if not almost always) fail to read in full the insurance
policies, automobile purchase agreements, and other contracts they sign. That does not mean
that a failure to read an agreement should be a defense to an action for breach of contract.
The legal supposition that consumers have agreed to all the terms of the contracts they sign,
and thus may be sued for breach of such terms, provides incentives to specify all the relevant
rights and obligations ex ante, thus reducing the uncertainty (and thus the risk) inherent in
contracting. If consumers could avoid their contracts simply by avowing that they had not read
them, the risks of contracting, and thus the costs of contracting, would increase, resulting in a
reduction in welfare from foregone opportunities for exchange. The result in Kodak has much
the same effect.
140. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 465.
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On balance, the answer is no: as a matter of antitrust policy,
Kodak was wrongly decided. Though the case identified a relatively
narrow group of consumers that suffered actual harm from the
practices at issue, and thus has a legitimate relationship to consumer
welfare, the harm was not easily amenable to cure through application
of antitrust. It is at least probable, if not certain, that the costs of the
decision, in the form of meritless litigation expenses, economically
unjustifiable settlements and verdicts, and legitimate business
practices wrongly foregone on the advice of counsel quite reasonably
unable to distinguish between safe and unsafe practices, will exceed
the relatively narrow benefits.141
C. The Proper Scope of the Essential Facilities Doctrine
Where does all this leave the essential facilities doctrine? Kodak's
ruling that aftermarkets may constitute relevant antitrust markets 42
has the effect of multiplying the number of cases in which a firm could
be said to have an actionable level of market power, regardless of
competition in the primary market. If, therefore, power in markets
such as "parts or service for Kodak copiers" is sufficient to state an
essential facilities claim, the antitrust laws could be transformed into a
powerful compulsory dealing law. Fortunately, neither analysis nor
precedent supports such a result. Terminal Railroad, Otter Tail, and
the prominent circuit cases such as MCI Communications Corp. v.
A T& T and Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., limit the scope of the doctrine to cases in which the
defendant possesses a natural monopoly. This includes only cases in
which the relevant market could not support more than one firm and
thus one in which the facility could not be replicated. 43
Limitation of the doctrine to situations involving natural
monopoly is not only consistent with the important antitrust principle,
confirmed in Aspen Skiing, that a firm has no obligation to assist its
141. The decision has thus far cost Kodak $72 million. It is worth noting in this regard that
Kodak has recently announced plans to sell its copier division, citing stiff competition and low
profits. See Kodak Planning to Sell Copier Division: Poor earnings, Stiff Competition Cited, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 16, 1996, at B9.
142. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477.
143. See supra text accompanying note 32 (defining natural monopoly); Fishman v. Estate of
Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 574 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("All of the essential
facilities cases involve natural monopolies."). The doctrine could conceivably be applied in cases
where a firm had a monopoly by reason of some governmental regulation barring entry into a
relevant market, which was not a natural monopoly, but such cases would have to be addressed
under whatever regulatory scheme erected the barrier in the first instance.
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competitors,'14 it is the only way to achieve doctrinal coherence
without vitiating that principle. By hypothesis, in a natural monopoly
market it will not be profitable for competitors to replicate existing
systems, such as the St. Louis terminal facilities or Otter Tail's power
lines. Thus, "[i]f the antitrust laws allowed the owner of the facility to
turn users away, there would be an incentive to wasteful duplication.
Monopoly profits serve as a lure; the result would be inefficient."'45 It
is for this reason, which is directly related to consumer welfare and
ineradicably tied to the cost structure of the market, that access may
be properly compelled in certain cases. At least in "bottlenecking"
cases such as Otter Tail, such a rule could increase competition and
thus efficiency.'
In situations not involving natural monopoly the market will
support more than one firm. Once this determination is made, the
essential facilities doctrine has no role to play because an entrant may
replicate the facility in question. So long as replication is possible, the
claim that a competing facility would be too costly to build is entitled
to no weight.'47 Such arguments represent a shift from the claim that it
is economically infeasible for a firm to replicate a facility (such as a
144. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,586 (1985).
145. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 574. This statement needs some qualification; obviously if firms
knew ex ante that a market would only support one firm any incentives to duplication would
likely be outweighed by the certainty of failure. Nevertheless, there would be at least some risk
from firms that thought they could succeed against the odds. Efficiency would dictate that access
would be a better solution in such situations.
146. This would only be true, however, if the firm in possession of the monopoly received a
fair rate of return: possession of a natural monopoly is no warrant for compulsory subsidization
of competitors at the expense of investors. This illustrates the importance of the federal
regulatory scheme, with its rate of return calculations, to the result in Otter Tail.
147. Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, Inc., 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1990)
("Antitrust law, however, does not require one competitor to give another a break just because
failing to do so offends traditional notions of fair play . . . . At the very least, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that 'duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible."') (quoting Hect
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978));
Fishman, 807 F.2d at 574 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("The high cost of a facility does not make
it 'essential."); HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 9, at 275 ("The courts have generally
interpreted the essential facilities doctrine to require a showing that no practical alternatives are
available, including alternatives that face cost disadvantages."). Assuming efficient capital
markets, plaintiffs seeking to undertake positive net present value investments involving the
replication of an existing facility, even at great cost, should be able to finance such investments,
though the cost might be high. The cost of financing is not a legitimate antitrust concern,
however (among other things it is a distributional concern). And if an investment involving
replication did not have a positive net present value, and thus could not sustain financing, it is
hard to see why social welfare would be enhanced by allowing the investment to go forward
through a competitor subsidy.
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bridge or power grid) to the claim that a plaintiff firm would be better
off, and thus a better competitor, if it did not have to bear the capital
expenses borne by the defendant. This immediately reduces to the
somewhat less than lofty legal insight that competition is easier if one
is entitled to subsidies from one's competitors. Such claims are entitled
to no legal weight, either theoretically or as a doctrinal matter.' 8 In
appropriate cases (which will be very few), the cost of replication may
have a role to play in analyzing the likelihood of entry when
considering whether an existing firm has market power. Such analysis
is fundamentally different than an "essential facilities" analysis,
however, and will not support an order that a firm deal with its
competitors. By reducing the returns available to existing firms,
compulsory dealing would diminish investment ex ante in otherwise
profitable ventures and thus diminish consumer welfare.149 This
analysis, which parallels the economic premises of copyright, must
always be undertaken in evaluating an essential facilities claim.
As we shall see, this analysis compels the rejection of essential
facilities claims in most contexts relevant to computer software.
Before explaining this conclusion, however, we must examine some of
the peculiar characteristics of copyright as applied to software.
III
Networks, Externalities, and Innovation:
Competitive Implications of Copyright Protection of Computer
Software
Having defined the proper parameters of the essential facilities
doctrine, we turn to the application of that doctrine in the rapidly-
evolving field of copyright protection of computer software. As noted
generally above, copyright's concerns parallel those of antitrust in
some respects with several important differences. To recap briefly, the
production of intellectual property, which is the statutory and
constitutional grail of copyright, is largely a function of the scope of
protection against copying provided by the copyright laws. If the
protection is too strong (or too broad, if you prefer) investment in
148. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir.
1986) ("Consumers would be worse off if a firm with monopoly power had a duty to extend
positive assistance to new entrants, or, having extended it voluntarily a duty to continue it
indefinitely."); see also Reisner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 671 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
858 (1982).
149. Professor Areeda makes a similar point. See Areeda, supra note 19, at 851.
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intellectual property will be diminished by the risk of infringement,
including the threat of infringement suits. If the protection is too weak
(narrow), investment will be diminished by the risk of competition
from copiers who did not bear the costs of innovation.
Adjusting the scope of legal protection necessary to achieve the
optimal level of production and innovation (investment) in intellectual
property is the key to a successful copyright regime. This balancing
may call for "fine-tuning" the property rights granted by copyright, at
least in a rough sense. Cookbooks may receive less protection than
novels, for example, because less investment is required to publish
them and the lower returns from relatively weak copyright protection
thus may not decrease production in cookbooks in any material way.'
Antitrust has no analogue to this endeavor. It takes the allocation of
property rights-whether it be the right to exclude others from the
plant premises or to exclude others from copying software-as a given
and inquires whether firms possessing those rights are engaging in
anticompetitive activity, by which antitrust means activity that will
allow a firm or firms to reduce output and price materially above
marginal cost. The analytical tools necessary to this analysis, gathered
under the general heading of price theory, provide few if any clues to
the question of how strong a copyright should be."
We begin our examination of software with some simplified
rudiments of technology.152 Computer hardware refers to wires,
circuits, chips, and the beige boxes that contain them.153 Software
refers to written code that instructs the computer to perform various
functions.54 We will be concerned with two types of software:
150. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("the
copyright in factual compilations is thin"); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering And The Rise of
Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of 'Lock-Out' Programs, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1091, 1108 (1995) (arguing that copyright for software should be analogous to factual
compilations such as cookbooks). This is not to say that the calculation of returns is an exact
science, which it of course is not. Firms, which are far better at estimating the returns necessary
to undertake a project in intellectual property, make mistakes all the time. And all investments
have some degree of risk, which is to say that more things can happen than will happen; an
investment may thus turn out bad even if it has a high expected value.
151. See HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 9.
152. The following discussion draws upon Professor Menell's review of technology. See Peter
S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection For Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987)
[hereinafter Menell, Tailoring]; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection
for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989) [hereinafter Menell, Scope of Protection].
153. Menell, Tailoring, supra note 152, at 1333.
154. Principal types of code include object code, which refers to a series of binary units (O's
and l's) that can be read by a computer directly and that instructs electronic switches to be
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operating systems and application programs. Operating systems
software refers to code that manages the internal functions of the
computer, such as retrieving data from or storing it in the computer's
memory, communicating with printers and modems, and the like.
155
Application software refers to code that performs specific functions,
such as word processing, spreadsheet analysis, and bookkeeping."
The scope of protection given to computer software under the
copyright laws is the key to understanding the issues raised by our first
two hypotheticals. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 157 and
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp."5 typify the
problems posed by the first hypothetical case.
A. Use of Copyright As A Barrier To Competition:
ISO Copying Of Manufacturer Software
Data General manufactured and serviced mini-computers; 159
Grumman Systems Support Corporation was an ISO that competed
with Data General in the market for service of computers
manufactured by Data General,1" which had the lion's share of the
market for servicing computers it had built.161 Data General's dispute
with Grumman revolved around a diagnostic software program called
Adex, which worked with Data General's most advanced and
profitable (both in sales and service) line of computers.162 Data
General would license Adex to customers who serviced their own
computers, but would not license Adex to customers who purchased
service, nor to ISOs16 such as Grumman."6 Data General refused to
turned on or off, and source code, which refers to sequences of instructions in higher level
language. Because computers can read only object code, source code is translated into object
code through the use of compilers or translators within the computer. Menell, Tailoring, supra
note 152, at 1334.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
158. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 1152.
160. Id.
161. "Although DG [Data General] ha[d] no more than a 5% share of the highly
competitive 'primary market' for mini-computers, DG occupie[d] approximately 90% of the
'aftermarket' for service of DG computers." Id.
162. Id. at 1154.
163. Id. at 1152. In Data General, the term used is TPM, "third party maintainer," which is
the equivalent of ISO, "independent service organization," in Kodak, 504 U.S. at 451.
164. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1152.
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license Adex to Grumman, 165 placing Grumman at a competitive
disadvantage and prompting what might charitably be called a creative
campaign by Grumman to acquire copies of the software. 16 Data
General responded by suing Grumman for violation of its copyrights
and misappropriation of trade secrets;167 Grumman defended in part
by contending that Data General was illegally maintaining a monopoly
in the market for service of its computers by refusing to license
Grumman to use the diagnostic software."6
MAI built computers and designed software to run them,
including both operating systems software and diagnostic software.1'
MAI licensed this software to purchasers of its machines;1" the
licenses allowed purchasers to make a specified number of copies of
the software for their own internal needs, but prohibited third parties
from making any copies.171 Peak was an ISO that serviced MAI
computers. It was founded by former MAI service employees, who
took some of their customers with them when they started Peak.1" It
was undisputed that to service the computers Peak needed to start
them up and determine whether they were running the MAI operating
system properly.13 This entailed copying the operating system
software from a storage device, such as a hard disk, to the computer's
random access memory (RAM),174 which is comprised of memory
chips that retain the information they are given only so long as they
are electrically charged.175 The Peak technicians could then view the
165. Id.
166. Grumman's methods created a poor record, to say the least. Former Data General
employees took copies with them when they moved to Grumman; Grumman used copies given
to former Data General service customers who terminated Data General's service but refused to
return the software (as required by Data General's service agreement); and Grumman used
and copied software inadvertently left behind by Data General technicians. Id. at 1154-55.
167. In due course a jury awarded Data General over $27,000,000 in damages. Id. at 1152.
168. Id. at 1156.
169. MAI, 991 F.2d at 513.
170. Id. at 517.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 513.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. As a district court in another case involving MAI put it:
[T]he RAM in MAI computers is composed of dynamic random access memory chips
(DRAMs) and static random access memory chips (SRAMs), with DRAMs
predominating. DRAMs are 'dynamic' because they must be repeatedly 'refreshed'
with an electrical charge or they will lose the information stored within them. SRAMs
do not require such refreshing. Both DRAMs and SRAMs, however, quickly lose their
information when electrical power is removed. Thus, they are volatile, and for this
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"systems error log," which was a part of the operating systems
software, to diagnose the fault in the system and subsequently verify
the effectiveness of a repair.176
MAI sued Peak, claiming that this copying violated MAI's
copyrights, and obtained an injunction that was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit.17 The Court's analysis was straightforward: the Copyright Act
prohibits copying, which is defined as fixing a work in a tangible
medium in such a manner that the work can be "perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device."'78 Peak's copying of the operating system
into the computer RAM, for the express purpose of "perceiving" and
acting on the information generated, easily met this definition.
179
Given the pleadings before it, the court did not believe it needed more
information to decide the case. This was unfortunate, because the
decision thus did not reach the more interesting issue of whether Peak
could defend its infringement on the grounds of fair use. If Peak tried,
could MAI have rebutted the defense on the ground that Peak was
formed by former MAI employees, arguably free riding on MAI's
investment in computer technology and in them? Or would the court
have rejected such an argument on the theory that if MAI had wanted
to bar its employees from competing, it should have negotiated
enforceable noncompetition agreements with them ex ante? What
about the consumers-purchasers of computers who presumably knew
the terms of the license when they bought the computers?1" Should
the law leave the fate of the ISOs to the ex ante contracting skills of
purchasers, or should it intervene on their behalf?
From the antitrust perspective, these ISO cases are familiar; they
bear a strong resemblance to Kodak, and indeed rely almost entirely
on the Court's approval in that case of antitrust suits in aftermarkets.
There is a crucial difference. Whereas Kodak excluded ISOs from its
aftermarkets through the alleged use of pressure on parts suppliers to
reason are often termed 'volatile memory,' in contrast with ROM, the contents of
which are semi-permanent.
Advanced Computer Sys. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 362 (E.D. Va. 1994).
176. MA!, 991 F.2d at 518.
177. Id. at 513.
178. Id. at 517 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1990)).
179. Id. at 518.
180. In this respect, MAI presents a harder case than Kodak for invocation of the antitrust
laws because in MAI the license was specified at the time of sale. Thus the case is analogous to
Justice Scalia's hypothetical contract for a Kodak copier in which it is specified ex ante that only
Kodak may service the machine. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 490-91.
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tie parts to service, MAI and Data General sought to exclude ISOs in
their cases through suits alleging copyright infringement. The antitrust
claims in these cases thus tend to raise essential facilities claims rather
than tying claims, based on the notion that access to the diagnostic
software is essential for the ISOs to compete in service markets.
This difference is important in two respects. First, whatever one
thinks of the merits of the tying theories approved in Kodak, MAI and
Data General lack the elements of legitimate essential facilities claims.
Second, apart from this substantive failure, antitrust should defer to
such "power" as copyright laws confer upon copyright holders even if,
as in these cases, the policy goals of copyright are not furthered.
With respect to the elements of the essential facilities claim, the
threshold question is whether the market for the essential facility-
here the diagnostic software to which the ISOs sought access-bears
the characteristics of a natural monopoly such that replication of the
facility is not economically feasible.181 Stating the question in these
terms reveals the odd fit between the essential facilities doctrine and
the Kodak aftermarkets in which the ISOs operate. In the first place,
which market is diagnostic software a part of?"8 For MAI's
computers, the "error log" portion of the diagnostic software was part
of the computer's general operating system software;183 other portions
of MAI's diagnostic software, like Data General's Adex software,
were separate."l At least the built-in operating system software would
appear to be part of the computer itself for market analysis purposes,
and thus part of the competitive primary market. It is a fair question
whether even Adex, which was sometimes licensed apart from Data
General computers, can constitute a meaningful market. Though the
district court found a factual dispute on the point precluding summary
judgment, it is not at all clear that it would be efficient for Data
General to produce diagnostic software separately from the computers
themselves.'8 5
181. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
182. Apologies to those who concur with Churchill that a preposition is a terrible thing to
end a sentence with.
183. MAI, 991 F.2d at 518.
184. Id. at 517.
185. The court concluded that diagnostic software could be a separate market from
computer service, because some customers were willing to purchase the software without
purchasing service from either Data General or a third party. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1180. This
fact does not address the question whether it would have been efficient for Data General to write
diagnostic software except as part of its manufacture of the computers. This is not to say that
there could never be a separate market for diagnostic software. There may be such a market, but
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The difference is important because the primary market for
minicomputers was "highly competitive."'" Data General, for
example, had only 5% of the market.187 The cost structure of the
primary market thus quite obviously did not resemble a natural
monopoly market in any respect. Because this threshold condition for
an essential facilities claim could not be met, the claim should rightly
fail.' 8 This answer, satisfactory as a doctrinal matter, and vital if the
essential facilities doctrine is to be confined to economically sensible
turf, still has a bit of an unsatisfactory ring. There is no realistic chance
that any ISO will go into the computer market. Apart from their lack
of capital and expertise at building computers rather than servicing
them, computers were not an input for the ISOs' business-they were
what the ISOs wanted to service.
Attempting to move diagnostic software out of the primary
market does not solve the problem, either. Recall that under Kodak"8
and Jefferson Parish,'9 a market for a good or service exists if there is
sufficient consumer demand for firms to provide that good or service
apart from related goods or services. Thus, tires are a separate market
from cars because there is sufficient demand to support tire
manufacturers on their own, even though there is an obvious
complementary relationship between the two markets. The same is
true for cameras and film, VCRs and videocassetes, CD players and
CDs, etc. But the cases reveal no evidence of a market for
minicomputer diagnostic software. MAI and Data General only
produce such software in conjunction with (and largely as a part of)
their computers; the ISOs in those cases did not produce such software
at all.
Even assuming that diagnostic software could be separated from
computers in an economically meaningful way, it would not
necessarily follow that the ISOs could not write diagnostic software
this inquiry is closer than the question whether there are separate markets for parts and service;
as in Kodak, the development of a service industry strongly suggests that separate markets in fact
exist. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 642.
186. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1152.
187. Id.
188. One could of course imagine an ISO asserting a perverse reverse tying claim-that MAI
had tied diagnostic software to operating systems software in order to move diagnostic software
into a competitive market-but such a claim would have no doctrinal support. The mind does
reel, however, at the very odd arguments that begin to make sense with respect to these unusual
claims.
189. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,490-91 (1992).
190. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984).
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themselves or that an adept programmer would not see an opportunity
to write programs for different brands of computers for sale to ISOs.
At least one court has felt comfortable asserting that ISOs "are free to
develop their own diagnostic software, should they so choose.""19 This
conclusion may be correct, but we must be more careful than the court
was in drawing it. Software has high fixed costs (such as employing
programmers to write the code) and very low variable costs (such as
copying the code onto disks and selling them). Assuming that different
software is required for each brand of computer, the market over
which the fixed costs can be spread may be fairly small (though
perhaps not for third-party suppliers), thus making it difficult for a
party that did not reap revenues from the computers themselves to
justify incurring the costs of writing software.'l While this would tend
to support an argument that the cost structure of diagnostic software
made it difficult to replicate, it also tends to undermine the claim that
diagnostic software is a facility separate from computers in any
meaningful sense.
There is thus little merit to the claim that access to diagnostic
software in a computer aftermarket is an essential facility under the
Sherman Act. Even if diagnostic software could realistically be
considered a facility independent of the computers, with natural
monopoly characteristics, considerations of copyright policy compel
therejection of the antitrust claim. As the Data General court rightly
noted, copyright grants a "monopoly" over copying of the relevant
work (which is of course not to be confused with a monopoly in a
relevant market for antitrust purposes) in order to ensure that
sufficient economic returns are held out to induce firms to invest in
creative works."9 Antitrust is only concerned with returns to particular
firms to the extent that it seeks to prevent firms from pricing above
their marginal cost because of some defect in market structure, not
because of the characteristics of the firm's assets.' 4 Because copyright
is concerned with securing adequate returns to creators of creative
works, the "power" granted to copyright holders must be determined
191. MAI, 845 F. Supp. at 368.
192. On the other hand, it could be that computer firms would sell hardware at cost or at a
slight loss, planning on earning a profit solely through service, protected by copyright. The
possibility of revenue shifting between primary and aftermarkets to take advantage of unique
aftermarket elements is examined in greater detail in the discussion below concerning network
effects.
193. See generally Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187.
194. See DOJ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at § 2.2.
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in accordance with copyright principles and copyright goals, through
application or amendment of the copyright laws, not through the
courts, and particularly not through courts using the antitrust laws.
After all, the ISOs in these cases have problems because copyright
prohibits them from copying the diagnostic software temporarily into
the computers' RAM, not because of any structural defect in the
aftermarkets, as was alleged in Kodak. Moreover, antitrust has
traditionally deferred to the intellectual property laws with respect to
the breadth of intellectual property rights.1" Such deference is
appropriate, even in these cases, because antitrust does not have the
analytical tools necessary to determine the appropriate breadth of
such rights.
Still, there are very good arguments, based in the policy and goals
of copyright, for amending those laws to allow the limited, temporary
copying of diagnostic software into computer RAM at issue in these
cases.1" Admittedly, both MAI and Data General involved the
copying of material portions of copyrighted software in order to allow
the copier to use the expressive aspects of that software to compete
with the copyright holder."9 Neither Peak nor Grumman was
attempting to create new software or other innovations; they simply
wanted to use copyrighted work as an aspect of their provision of
copier service.' The courts' condemnation of their copying thus
195. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (holding patent holder
does not violate antitrust laws in setting price for initial sale by licensee); Data General, 36 F.3d
at 1187 ("[A]n author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a
presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers."); SCM v.
Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982) (holding patent
monopolist absolutely privileged to refuse to license invention); see also Independent Service
Orgs. Antitrust Litigation v. Xerox, 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (D. Kan. 1995) (collecting cases).
196. As of this writing, a bill (H.R. 533) has been introduced to remedy the problem
discussed in the text. The bill would modify Section 117 of the Copyright Act to permit a
"rightful possessor" of a program to make or authorize the making of a copy of the program so
long as the copy is "created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine ...... (Other modifications of Section 117 have also been
proposed.)
197. Given the nature of RAM, of course, the copy would disappear when the RAM chips
were no longer charged with electricity-i.e., when the computer was turned off.
198. It was on this basis that the court in Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.,
64 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996), rightly distinguished these
cases from the its holding in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th
Cir. 1992). The copying in Sega was for the purpose of allowing the defendant to enable its own
creative work, which did not infringe Sega's copyright, to interface with Sega's hardware (the
elements of the software code necessary to achieve compatibility were not themselves
copyrightable). Id. In contrast, neither Peak nor Grumman intended to create any intellectual
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resulted in little (and likely no) loss of creative work to the public. To
this extent, one may say that the decisions are consistent with the goals
of copyright: if an alleged infringer's copying does not promote the
creation of new intellectual property, why should such copying be
allowed?
One reason is that this logic cuts both ways. With respect to the
software at issue, MAI and Data General had no more interest in
expanding the scope of available intellectual property than Peak or
Grumman. They simply wanted to be able to fix the computers, too.
Assertion of their copyrights thus fits awkwardly with the purposes of
copyright, even though their programs were indisputably
copyrightable (and copyrighted) material. By allowing the use of
copyrighted material as a utilitarian tool for the operation of
nonexpressive hardware, copyright does not increase "the harvest of
knowledge," 1 but may give the copyright holder the ability to extract
greater returns from its hardware through the service market over the
life of the hardware." While copyright is concerned with preserving
those returns related to the creation of information, there is little
reason to allow the use of copyright to secure supracompetitive
returns unrelated to that purpose.
As in Kodak, the costs of the strategic use of copyright as a
barrier to entry into the service aftermarket for a computer falls in
large part on the purchaser of the computer. Until Congress acts in
this regard, consumers who own machines that entail aftermarkets in
which copyrighted material plays a part may attempt to protect
themselves from price gouging through the same panoply of measures
available to purchasers of Kodak's copiers. In healthy markets, the
adverse reputational effects of using copyright to extract an extra
pound of flesh from a purchaser of a durable good is a significant
deterrent to such behavior. Assuming a competitive primary market, a
firm that engages in such behavior will lose sales from prospective
purchasers and will have trouble persuading existing owners to buy
again when the time comes. It is no coincidence, as Professor Shapiro
property at all, much less use the copyrighted material as a basis for such work; all they wanted to
do was fix computers.
199. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985).
200. I say "ability" rather than "power" because the latter term has the seemingly
hypnotic ability to sidetrack meaningful analysis and create the illusion of problems properly
remediable under the antitrust laws. As the previous discussion should establish, such "power" as
exists in aftermarkets is likely to harm consumers only in relatively rare cases, and then only on
an essentially "one-shot" basis.
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notes, that MAI emerges from the "declining minicomputer
market."' Firms exiting a market obviously will not be repeat players
in that market, and thus will not bear the costs of opportunistic
behavior that gouges the existing customer base in that market. But
the failure is not complete. If firms exiting a declining market continue
to compete in even loosely related markets, they will have some
concern for their reputation; customers victimized by a firm in the
minicomputer market will be wary of buying other items such as
desktops or laptops from that firm as well. To the extent reputational
forces are not a complete answer, however, change must come from
within copyright itself. Antitrust lacks the analytical tools to
distinguish between uses of a copyright that further the purposes of
the copyright laws and uses that do not.
B. Copying For Compatibility: Reverse Engineering, Replication, And The
Essential Facilities Doctrine
As essential facilities cases falling within the antitrust/copyright
intersection go, MAI and Data General are relatively easy. Neither
antitrust doctrine nor antitrust policy supports an essential facilities
claim. Copyright doctrine supports an infringement claim, but
copyright policy fairly clearly calls for modification of this rule. Thus,
under current doctrine, copyright defendants who are antitrust
counterclaimants should lose the infringement action and their
counterclaim: on a normative level they should win the infringement
action. Copyright policy and doctrine come much closer together in
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 2 which poses both the
aftermarket problem (there is, it seems, no end to Kodak's reach)
and the significantly different copyright issue of copying software for
the sole purpose of adapting noncopyrightable functional code to
independent expressive work in order to render that work compatible
with another system component.2°4 Much has been written about Sega,
and the full effects of the decision are likely yet to be realized. Like
Kodak, it appears to be a trend-setter. Unlike Kodak, it appears to be
pointed in the right direction, and there are many good reasons to be
grateful for the decision from a policy perspective.
201. Shapiro, Aftermarkets, supra note 77, at 490.
202. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
203. Id. at 1514.
204. Id. at 1522.
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The news is not all good, however. Although the result in Sega
was desirable, the opinion cannot be completely squared with the
Supreme Court precedent the opinion cited. Understandably, for a
circuit court confronting a novel issue and wanting to reach a desirable
result, the court did not acknowledge this fact nor did it attempt to
justify its departure on the economic merits of the case. The court
instead attempted to portray the decision as fitting within the existing
law. It did not, at least not exactly. The court's precedential constraints
led it to avoid issues that must be confronted in the debate over how
the fair use defense will evolve to accommodate the particular needs
of computer software. Sega, in short, needs to be dissected, analyzed in
the context of significant empirical research, and then embodied in the
Copyright Act.'
1. The Sega Decision And The Fair Use Defense
Sega manufactured computer-game hardware and computer
games, which, as noted above, are simply a type of software program.
In order to run on the Sega hardware, computer games needed certain
codes copyrighted by Sega, which normally licensed them to computer
game developers. Accolade manufactured computer games and
wanted to produce games that could run on Sega hardware. Accolade
explored the possibility of obtaining a license from Sega, but found the
terms unacceptable.' Accolade therefore began to "reverse
engineer" Sega's games in an effort to isolate the code needed to make
its games compatible with Sega's hardware. This involved decompiling
the program from object code into source code, which could then be
read by Accolade's programmersw Accolade programmers studied
three different Sega games, isolated similarities, and eventually
isolated the code necessary for compatibility, which they then added
to a manual describing the interface requirements. ° These portions of
the code were themselves functional, and thus not entitled to
205. Much the same could be said for most doctrines in the law-particularly the need for
empirical evaluations of the accuracy of doctrinal assumptions and whether the doctrine
produces the results it seeks. Sega's shortcomings in this respect do not reflect analytical failings
as much as they do a lack of available evidence, the inability of courts (especially appellate
courts) to undertake factual investigations, and the difficulty, at the circuit level, of incorporating
facts into holdings where the facts conflict with doctrinal assumptions.
206. Sega's proposed agreement "would have required that Sega be the exclusive
manufacturer of all games produced by Accolade." 977 F.2d at 1514.
207. Id. at 1514-15 n.2.
208. Id. at 1514-15.
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independent copyright protection. The program as a whole,
however, all of which was copied, was entitled to copyright
protection.21 Accolade contended that, apart from the interface
specifications, "none of the code in its own games is derived in any
way from its examination of Sega's code."2 1
On these facts, Accolade was found to have copied Sega's code
within the meaning of the copyright statute,21 a decision that was
doubtless correct, but also to have a fair use defense to Sega's
infringement claim, which is the element of the decision of interest to
us here.213 The nonexclusive statutory elements of a defense of fair use
include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.21a
On the first element, Sega argued that the purpose of Accolade's
copying was to make a profit by competing against Sega's products. 21,
At the time Sega was decided, the Supreme Court's decision in Harper
& Row, Publisher's, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises216 held that a
commercial purpose weighed heavily against a finding of fair use.217 In
light of this authority, the Sega court's analysis was marvelously
innovative and prescient. As the court reasoned:
[T]here is no evidence in the record that Accolade sought to avoid
performing its own creative work. Indeed, most of the games that
Accolade released for use with the Genesis console were originally
developed for other hardware systems. Moreover, with respect to
the interface procedures for the Genesis console, Accolade did not
seek to avoid paying a customarily charged fee for use of those
procedures, nor did it simply copy Sega's code; rather, it wrote
its own procedures based on what it had learned through
disassembly . . . . [A]lthough Accolade's ultimate purpose was the
release of Genesis-compatible games for sale, its direct purpose in
209. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1995); 977 F.2d at 1522-23.
210. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1518 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(2) (1990)).
211. 977 F.2d at 1515.
212. Id. at 1527.
213. Id. at 1527-28.
214. Id. at 1521-22 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1990)).
215. 977 F.2d at 1522.
216. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
217. Id. at 562.
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copying Sega's code, and thus its direct use of the copyrighted
material, was simply to study the functional requirements for
Genesis compatibility so that it could modify existing games and
make them usable with the Genesis console.
218
These facts, which sharply distinguish Sega from MAI and Data
General, led the court to the further conclusion that Accolade's
copying was consistent with the overarching purposes of copyright-to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"219 -because
Accolade's copying "led to an increase in the number of
independently designed video game programs offered for use with the
Genesis console."'  This analysis decided the first element in
Accolade's favor,1 and has been substantially vindicated, at least in
the context of parody, though perhaps with broader implications, by
the Supreme Court's opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.'
The court's discussion of the fourth element is more problematic.
The question was whether, if the challenged practice became
widespread, "it would adversely effect the potential market for the
copyrighted work."' Because copyright analysis focuses on returns to
those who invest in intellectual property, and because such returns are
a function of market forces, this factor is "undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use."' The Sega court interpreted this
question to ask only whether the challenged practice would "usurp the
market" for the copyrighted work, in which case it would not be fair
use, or merely facilitate competition with the copyrighted work by a
defendant's product, in which case a fair use defense would succeed.'
This dichotomy is problematic, and the court's brief discussion did
little to point the way towards a solution. Two principal issues are
raised: how is the "market" in which the infringer's use is evaluated to
be defined, and what is the "use" relevant to the fourth element.
One would hope that an analysis of market effects would begin
with a reasoned discussion of market definition. That hardly ever
happens, though, and in this shortcoming Sega is regrettably typical.
218. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522.
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
220. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
221. Id.
222. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
223. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
224. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
225. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986)
(quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180,182 (2d Cir. 1981)).
226. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
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The Sega court did not formally define the market in which it
evaluated the fourth factor. Indeed, the court appeared not to have
perceived a definitional issue. This may be understandable because the
Copyright Act provides that the market relevant to a fair-use defense
is the market for the copyrighted work.' In many cases only one
market will fit this bill; the question in Sega was not so easy-was the
relevant market the market for computer games, in which Sega's
copyrighted material competed with Nintendo's (and later Sony's)
material,' or was it the aftermarket for Sega-compatible computer
games? The court's opinion makes clear that it perceived the relevant
market to be the one for Sega-compatible games. Thus the court's
reference to Accolade as a "new competitor, the first lawful one that is
not a Sega licensee,"'  and its more worrisome statement that "an
attempt [by Sega] to monopolize the market by making it impossible
for others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of
promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong
equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine."
Professor Miller picks up on the court's "monopolization"
rhetoric and takes exception with this definition, contending that:
There is no principled basis for the Ninth Circuit's definition of the
relevant market in which monopoly control was to be prevented as
the market for Sega cartridges; for example, the court also could
have defined the market in terms of home entertainment systems, a
market in which Sega and Nintendo compete fiercely, and required
Accolade to design and vend its own console, or expend the effort
necessary to make cartridges compatible with Sega's console without
copying. The underlying premise that led the Ninth Circuit to
declare a "market" in Sega cartridges, and to encourage competition
in it, was probably Sega's success in the home entertainment field. 231
While quite right from an antitrust perspective, this criticism does
not advance the copyright analysis. From an antitrust perspective, a
market defined to include only Sega-compatible games ignores
227. Id. at 1521-22 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994)).
228. Indeed, less than a year ago, news reports stated that Nintendo was "locked in a battle
with Sega Enterprises, Ltd. and Sony Corp., both of which introduced players last September
that use powerful computer chips to provide faster and more colorful games than Nintendo's
older machines." Playing the Waiting Game, Nintendo Touts Its New Ultra 64 But Says It Won't
Release It Until April, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 27, 1995 at 2D; see also Laurence
Zuckerman, Sega's Chief Steps Down, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 17, 1996 (Finance), available
in LEXIS, News Library (describing continued competition in the video-game player market).
229. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
230. Id. at 1523-24.
231. Miller, supra note 71, at 1019-20 (citations omitted).
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competition from Nintendo (and now Sony), and thus ignores the
discipline such competition imposes on Sega's conduct with respect to
its console. Among other things, such competition could provide
Accolade with the opportunity to play the primary competitors off
against one another, if Accolade's intellectual property was
sufficiently desirable to prompt an auction. Although these arguments
were rejected in Kodak, the discussion in the previous section
demonstrates that they retain considerable force. Discipline in the
primary market is relevant because it will keep Sega from doing the
things antitrust seeks to prevent-reducing output to price above
marginal cost or colluding with others to do so.
The antitrust analysis will not do for copyright purposes because
market definition in the fair use context raises an important difference
between antitrust and copyright. Copyright is not content with the
conclusion that Sega may not price above marginal cost, and thus
copyright analysis cannot end at the point this conclusion is reached.
Copyright is concerned with promoting innovation, which increases
the array of goods available to consumers. Were Sega a monopolist in
a market with highly elastic supply, for example, antitrust would not
be concerned, but copyright would. This difference is relevant to the
market definition issue because innovation requires investment, which
(and this is the entire premise of the Copyright Act) requires that
copyright preserve enough of the market for the copyright holder to
obtain the competitive return necessary to induce investment. It is
thus not sufficient for copyright purposes to identify a market that
constrains supracompetitive pricing; the relevant market must be
related to the returns available to the copyright holder.
In cases involving aftermarkets, a proper approach to market
definition will necessarily entail consideration of the effect of the
defense on all markets from which the returns on copyrighted material
are derived because rational firms will calculate returns from all such
markets in deciding whether to invest in intellectual property. This is
particularly important in the software context. From the consumer's
point of view, there is no demand for Sega games apart from Sega
consoles, nor for consoles without games. Consumers of Sega's
products want to play video games. This requires a system entailing
both hardware and software, which are therefore extremely strong
complementary goods. Sega is in this respect similar to Kodak; copier
purchasers did not want machines, parts, or service as such-they
wanted copies. This does not mean that the aftermarkets may not
constitute legitimate markets for antitrust purposes. On this point
1996]
Kodak is right, although as noted above this conclusion in and of itself
cannot justify the invocation of antitrust in aftermarket cases.' When
combined with copyright's concern for returns to the copyright holder,
however, it means that antitrust's narrow focus on supracompetitive
pricing in these aftermarkets is inadequate for copyright purposes, and
thus that these markets may not be viewed in isolation from the
primary market, as the Kodak court did.33 The court in Kodak was in
part concerned that Kodak would shift its source of revenues from the
competitive primary markets into the uncompetitive aftermarkets, 2
raising among other things the possibility of price discrimination in the
aftermarkets. Because copyright is concerned with returns to the
copyright holder, such practices are not necessarily evil. To the
contrary, copyright fulfills its mission precisely by giving whatever
degree of market "power" copyright holders may enjoy through a
prohibition on copying.'
In this respect, the opinion in Sega is analytically deficient. The
fourth fair use factor asks what portion of the market will be put at
risk by the defendant's use; the broader the market definition, the
smaller the amount of that market that could be "usurped," and the
more likely a fair use defense would be to succeed. The Sega court was
concerned with justifying its fair use defense' and, as we shall see in a
moment, with establishing that little of the relevant market would be
232. There are differences: copier purchasers could perhaps reduce their consumption of
service (though perhaps not parts) by stretching the period between service calls, while playing a
video game always requires both a game and a console. Moreover, Accolade might well be able
to build a hardware platform for its games; it would not have made sense from any perspective
(even had it been possible, which it almost assuredly was not) for the ISOs in Kodak to go into
the copier business.
233. As noted above, this analysis was improper in Kodak as an antitrust matter; it is
improper in the copyright context both for those reasons and for the additional reasons unique to
copyright's concern with economic returns to copyright holders discussed in the text.
234. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 480-86.
235. Considering all markets relevant to an integrated system such as computer games does
not predictably favor either copyright holders or alleged infringers asserting a fair use defense.
The broader the market definition the narrower the share any given firm is considered to have.
Moreover, an increase in the amount of software that will run on a given item of hardware will
confer some benefit on those who reap returns from the hardware (a phenomenon examined
formally under the proper rubric of network effects below), as the well-known fight between
Beta and VHS standards for video recorders makes clear. Entry of a new source of software
(such as Accolade) for a given item of hardware (such as Sega's console) may benefit the
hardware manufacturer overall; it may be that the availability of Accolade games would make
Sega's consoles more popular, thus giving Sega a broader (though competitive) market for its
games. Examination of both the primary market and aftermarket will capture any such benefits,
which an examination of the aftermarket alone would miss.
236. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24.
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usurped.' The court thus presumably would have been interested in a
broad market definition; in this case one keyed to the primary market,
which would have resulted in the conclusion that less of the market
would be preempted (Accolade's share presumably being a constant).
Instead, the court opted, without discussion, for the narrower
aftermarket, which it characterized with its "monopoly" rhetoric.'
The court could only have meant that Sega was seeking a monopoly in
games that played on its (non-monopolistic) consoles; the consoles
themselves competed in the primary market against Nintendo. Unless
Sega began manufacturing games that worked on Nintendo consoles,
which for reasons discussed in the following section it would have
every reason not to do, Sega's returns on its copyrights were keyed to
this market as well: its games could be no more popular than its
consoles. In short, both markets were relevant to the returns Sega
would realize on its intellectual property. Therefore, the effect of
Accolade's use on both markets should have been evaluated.
The Sega court's logical slip (not compelled by the Copyright Act
itself) is revealing. The court was not thinking of markets in terms of
returns to copyright holders; instead it sought to support the broader
purpose of expanding the variety of available computer games. The
rhetoric of "monopoly" was useful for this purpose: it implied a need
for a ruling that would "bust up" the monopoly and allow new
competitors into the "market." Still, it is hard to know how useful the
loaded term "monopoly" can be in these circumstances. It did not
mean that Sega could raise the prices of either its consoles or its games
in a monopolistic manner-Nintendo, later joined by Sony, prevented
that from happening, and in any event copyright would not necessarily
be offended if Sega earned supracompetitive returns. Nor could it
meaningfully refer to Sega's dominance of the market for games that
operate on its console. Similar to Kodak's position in parts and service
for its copiers, Sega is likely to have a large, if not dominant, position
in the "market" for games that run on its consoles because it created
the market. If nothing else, Sega's costs will be lower because it does
not have to reverse engineer its own games, meaning that it can alter
the interfaces of its consoles more cheaply than its competitors can
reverse engineer them. 9
237. Id. at 1523.
238. Id. at 1526.
239. The cost of reverse engineering may be considerable. See generally Andrew Johnson-
Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 843 (1994).
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Particularly if consumers are able to buy more than one hardware
system (an option evidently unnecessary and too expensive in Kodak
but perhaps not uncommon with respect to computer games), a firm's
dominance in the aftermarket for games that play on its consoles does
not imply a paucity of computer game options for consumers, any
more than it implied in Kodak a paucity of options for those who
wanted to purchase copiers. There might well be more programs
available if Accolade could copy Sega's programs in some
circumstances, but that is a truism that does not help draw the line
between permissible and impermissible copying and has nothing to do
with the accepted meaning of "monopoly."' There would be more
games if all console manufacturers were taxed and the money sent to
subsidize third party game developers, but that does not mean that it
would be a good idea. Variety in intellectual property may be the
primary goal of the copyright laws, but it addresses only one side of
the tension between promoting creativity and preserving competitive
returns; that tension simply cannot be resolved by ignoring the other
half of the equation.21 The Sega court's failure to confront the market
definition issue, and its reliance on Sega's share of the aftermarket it
defined, truncated the analysis at precisely the point it began to get
interesting and weakened the court's hasty conclusion that Sega's
returns would be adequately preserved.
However the market was defined, the Sega court's dichotomy
between usurpation and competition within a market is neither a
tenable interpretation of Harper & Row nor a workable approach to
evaluating market preemption in the fair use context. 2 Harper &
240. This analysis, of course, threatens to become circular at one level: Sega has this cost
advantage only because of the copyright laws, which could be changed to eliminate that
advantage, and thus perhaps promote competition, if this were deemed desirable. The proper
analysis for evaluating such a proposal is discussed below.
241. Judge Boudin's concurrence in Lotus Development Corp. v Borland International, Inc.,
49 F.3d 807, 819-22 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 804, provides a nuanced discussion of this
tension and the inevitable trade-offs within copyright.
242. The usurpation standard emerges from Harper & Row, which involved the
unauthorized printing by The Nation of verbatim excerpts of President Ford's memoirs in an
effort to "scoop" a Time magazine review of the book. Time, which had contracted for the
exclusive right to publish and review excerpts of the book first, cancelled its article and refused to
pay the last installment on its contract. On these facts, the Court concluded that the effective
usurpation of a "market" in and of itself negated a fair use defense. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
567-69. Contrary to Professor Cohen's construction, no markets were "usurped" in anything
approaching a literal sense. Cohen, supra note 150, at 1127. The book still sold some copies, and
presumably was reviewed in other places. The publisher, however, lost $12,500 on the Time
contract, and whatever amount of sales that would have been generated by a cover article in
Time but were not generated by the article in the Nation. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567. The
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Row held that "a use that supplants any part of the normal market for
a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered an
infringement"2' and that "[i]solated instances of minor infringements,
when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad
on copyright that must be prevented." 2' The Sega court thus appears
to have broadened the scope of fair use beyond the point approved by
Harper & Row by allowing a copier to seize a greater share of relevant
sales than previously was found to defeat a fair use defense. Moreover,
the question whether investment in intellectual property will be
undertaken depends on the rate of return to be earned by the
investment.25 The calculation of such returns ex ante does not ask
simply whether a market is likely to exist or be completely usurped,
because markets themselves are not all-or-nothing creatures. Even a
"monopolistic" market in Sega's terms may not induce investment if
competition from substitute works is severe, and returns on software
might be sufficient to induce investment even if the Accolades of the
world were allowed to seize large portions of the relevant market.
Perhaps there is another way to look at the situation; one that
does not exceed Harper & Row's boundaries. The Ninth Circuit's
analysis of the first factor concluded that Accolade's computer games
were comprised of Accolade's own intellectual property.2' Accolade
was not copying Sega's property to help Accolade develop a
competitive game, it was copying Sega's copyrightable code only to
study the functional, noncopyrightable code, which it then adapted to
allow the game it already had developed to compete.27 As relevant to
the fourth fair use factor, this conclusion implies that Accolade's "use"
of Sega's copyrightable material had no market effect at all-
Accolade "used" that material only to the extent that it identified it as
Court found the former category of damages, by itself, sufficient to defeat a fair use defense,
stating that "[riarely will a case of copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of
actual damage." Id. It is unlikely that $12,500 amounted to even a rounding error on Harper &
Row's financial statements.
It is hard to believe that Sega's losses could be any less material, and losses on this scale
were presumably not what the Sega court meant by "usurpation." The Sega court commented
that the fourth factor weighed in Accolade's favor, "notwithstanding the minor economic loss
Sega might suffer," Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524, is at best difficult to square with the facts of Harper &
Row.
243. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing S.R. No. 94-473, p.65 (1975)).
244. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-473, p.6 5 (1975)).
245. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 37, at 13-14; see infra text accompanying note 267.




expressive code, rather than the functional interface code Accolade
needed, and then moved on. Because Accolade only incorporated the
adaptation of the nonprotected functional elements of Sega's interface
code into its program, any adverse effect on Sega's sales would come
from a consumer preference for Accolade's own intellectual property
over Sega's. As the court said, "it is the characteristics of the game
program as experienced by the user that determine the program's
commercial success . . . . [T]here is nothing in the record that
suggests that Accolade copied any of those elements."'  This is
exceedingly powerful reasoning: carried to its logical conclusion it
holds that Accolade could have usurped Sega's market completely
without vitiating its fair use defense because the diminution in Sega's
market share would not stem from Accolade's infringing "use" of
copyrightable material, which is the inquiry dictated by the fourth
factor.249
Against this Sega has a simple response, which is not without
some resonance. But for its infringement, Accolade would not be
competing in Sega's aftermarket at all. And if we conclude that
copyright would permit Accolade to drive Sega from the aftermarket
for Sega's consoles, Sega will effectively be reduced to the status of a
manufacturer of video recorders. There may be nothing wrong with
this. Many firms make video recorders and are perfectly happy doing
it, and from an antitrust perspective we should say that if consumers
prefer Accolade's product to Sega's, then Sega deserves to be driven
from the market. But can we afford to be so sanguine? The market
evidence is that Sega does not want to be just a console manufacturer,
it wants to provide consumers with a video game entertainment
system, entailing both the console and the software. Indeed, given
what it likely thought were its rights under the copyright laws, Sega
may have sold consoles at or near cost, planning on earning most of its
return through the sale of compatible software.' From an ex ante
perspective, Sega might well not have invested in either hardware or
248. Id. at 1523.
249. The strength of the argument is analogous to the strength of the related argument with
respect to MAI and Data General: because Accolade presumably would compete on the merits of
its own intellectual property rather than through the use of Sega's (copyrightable) intellectual
property, Sega's infringement claim may appear to be a tactical use of copyright to obtain a
competitive advantage beyond that which the copyright laws are intended to confer.
250. See Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 93, 104 (Spring 1994)[hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition]
(noting penetration pricing of hardware as possible signal of commitment to robust software
markets).
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software if it feared it could be driven from the software aftermarket
through reverse engineering such as Accolade's. If that response held
for firms generally, society would suffer a net loss of intellectual
property: without Sega's consoles, there is no aftermarket for
Accolade to enter.'51
There is logical force to both arguments, but precious little
empirical basis for untangling the competing logic. In such
circumstances, the best courts can do is to identify all the relevant
factors and possible consequences of ruling one way or the other,
examine such evidence as the market has to offer with respect to each
factor, and proceed cautiously as far as the evidence warrants, but not
one step farther. The basic premise of copyright rightly implies that
the scope of protection a copyright affords correlates with the returns
flowing to copyright holders. One cannot adjust the scope of
protection without a corresponding effect on the returns. It follows
that allowing reverse engineering will likely result in the loss of some
software that would have been produced under a more protective
regime. This does not mean that the Sega court was wrong, however. It
may well be that the marginal loss is insignificant because if Sega faced
no competition in its aftermarket, the additional software it produced
might be complacent and uninteresting. That is highly unlikely of
course, because Sega has to compete with Nintendo and Sony, but in
other circumstances it might be a valid consideration. Alternatively,
the increase in software induced by a regime that allowed reverse
251. This introduces yet another complex issue. If Congress or the Supreme Court were
simply to announce that henceforth reverse engineering would be allowed and firms such as Sega
would have to compete in their aftermarkets as well as with Nintendo and Sony, then firms such
as Sega would take this into account in deciding whether to invest in computer game systems. If
the returns were deemed inadequate, they would not invest. There is nothing unfair about that.
Firms make investment decisions based on the legal regime all the time, as the frequent use of
the Internal Revenue Code to induce or penalize investment demonstrates. Sega might well
protest that its investment is already made, and the legal tables were turned on it ex post, thus
essentially casting itself in the role of purchasers of Kodak copiers prior to the implementation of
Kodak's restrictive parts policies. This point is at best partially true; not only do firms make
investment decisions based on the legal regime, it is also no secret that the regime may change in
midstream, and smart firms should factor such uncertainty into their decisionmaking as well. Still,
the court in Sega was quite candid that its result might seem surprising at first blush. 977 F.2d at
1527. The case would not have occasioned the amount of commentary it has received had it been
easily anticipated from previous cases. See, e.g., Victor de Gyarfas, Note and Comment, Sega v.
Accolade: A Step Forward for Reverse Engineering? 23 Sw. U. L. REV. 571 (1994); William S.
Coats and Heather D. Rafter, The Games People Play: Sega v. Accolade and the Right to Reverse
Engineer Software, 15 HAsTINGs CoMm/ENT L.J. 557 (Spring 1993); Christopher W. Hager, Apples
and Oranges: Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use After Atari v. Nintendo and Sega v. Accolade, 20
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 259 (1994).
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engineering might more than make up for the marginal loss. This
reasoning seems to underlie the Sega court's assertion that allowing
Accolade to compete would not materially reduce the market for
Sega's software. Either way, however, we cannot accept Sega's implicit
conclusion, which Professor Cohen aptly summarizes as being that
"the purposes of copyright-to encourage the production and
distribution of creative works-is best served by allowing such
competition, not by blocking new market entrants,"' without a more
detailed analysis of the actual processes by which firms within the
software industry make investment decisions.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit did not construct an appropriate
analytical framework to deal with these complex issues. The fourth
fair use factor cannot be sensibly applied without a standard for
distinguishing cases in which an infringer seizes too much of the
market to assert the defense and cases in which the defense could
succeed. 2' In other words, the real question in these cases is how
much of the market can an infringer take before its use is unfair?
Contrary to Professor Cohen's reading, the Ninth Circuit never
confronted this issue squarely. It merely argued that Harper & Row
was distinguishable because, as Professor Cohen puts it, that case
"involved a 'scoop' of the heart of a copyrighted work that threatened
to supplant the market for the work entirely"'  and because
consumers would not buy more than one copy of President Ford's
memoirs while they do buy multiple copies of video games. 255 It is hard
to see how Harper & Row supports such a reading. The Court there
rejected a fair use defense based upon articles written about President
Ford's book,' rather than sales of the book (the copyrighted work)
itself. There was no question whether the "good parts" of the book
would be serialized in a magazine, the only question was whether they
would be serialized by Time for a fee or by the Nation for free. 7
Serialization of that particular book may have diminished rather than
spurred sales; either way, however, that factor was a constant feature
and thus could not sustain the rejection of the fair use defense.
252. Cohen, supra note 150, at 1128.
253. Professor Cohen agrees: "The question remains, as always, at what point-short of
every use, or every 'commercial' use, of copyrighted material, to draw the line." Cohen, supra
note 150, at 1126.
254. Id. at 1127 (arguing that Sega directly addressed the materiality question).
255. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
256. Harper & Row, 539 U.S. at 555-558.
257. Id. at 543.
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The court's assertion in Sega that consumers will buy Accolade's
games as well as Sega's, and thus little if any preemption will occur
even in the narrowly defined "Sega-games market," is similarly
problematic.' According to the court, it does not "seem unlikely that
a consumer particularly interested in sports might purchase both
Accolade's 'Mike Ditka Power Football' and Sega's 'Joe Montana
Football,' particularly if the games are, as Accolade contends, not
substantially similar." 9 But if the games are not substantially similar
in any meaningful sense, they presumably are not substitutes, not
competitors, and thus irrelevant to the market displacement issue,
though they would be relevant to Sega's potential market. 6 This is
perhaps a minor detail, because the substantial similarity argument is
untenable either way. If the games are identical they will compete
directly for sales to consumers with a taste for Sega-compatible
football, baseball, or whatever type of games. Even if they are not, so
long as consumers are unwilling to spend infinite sums on Sega-
compatible games, Accolade's entry with any type of game, identical
or not, will present consumers with alternatives to Sega and Sega-
licensed games for their Sega-compatible dollars, thus diminishing
Sega's potential and actual sales. 6
As noted, the court attempted to avoid the problem by positing
multiple purchases of every game.' But the proposition that
consumers will purchase both Mike Ditka's football game and Joe
Montana's football game is hardly so obvious that it is properly subject
to judicial notice on appeal. One would at least expect an analysis of
the incomes of game purchasers to determine whether the average
purchaser could afford to add two of every game to their electronic
libraries. No market is infinite. At some point the game would turn
zero sum as it likely would be from the start. In any event Harper &
Row cautions that the "potential market for the copyrighted work" is
entitled to some protection, and that market includes sales that could
go to Accolade if Accolade were to market Sega-compatible games.'
258. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
259. Id.
260. It is similarly not apparent why the court felt it proper to take Accolade's contentions at
face value on an appeal from entry of a preliminary injunction after evidentiary hearings.
261. This is not necessarily to say that such relatively indirect market preemption would
necessarily defeat a fair use defense; the point simply establishes that the Ninth Circuit's analysis
was materially incomplete.
262. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
263. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
1996]
Sega's analysis thus simply does not address the issue at the heart of
the fourth fair use element.
The doctrinal label we are given to deal with the problem is
"materiality:" Harper & Row endorses Professor Nimmer's view that
the fair use defense should be "'limited to copying by others which
does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is
copied. '"'I While the Sega court perhaps did not apply the usurpation
standard as stringently as a literal reading of Harper & Row might
dictate, its approach may have satisfied the spirit of that opinion and
of the fair use doctrine when the unique features of software are taken
into account. Sega rightly based its analysis on copyright first
principles, which also may be used to derive a rule of materiality for
the fourth fair use factor, taking into account the economic
characteristics of software markets. Applying the basic copyright
assumption that innovation is a function of willingness to invest,
probably the best feasible approach would be to draw a rough analogy
to the materiality standards developed under the federal securities
laws and ask, on a project-by-project basis within a given firm,
whether the amount of the market foreclosed by reverse engineering
would reduce the returns to a copyright holder by an amount that, ex
ante, would deter an economically rational firm from undertaking a
given investment in a particular software project.'
This analysis, which must be undertaken with respect to the
expected returns of each project (rather than with respect to the
wealth of the firm as a whole), entails the familiar calculation of net
present value: discounting the cash flows to be realized from the
investment through an appropriate terminal point, using a discount
rate accurately reflecting the firm's cost of capital (the amount the
firm could earn by investing the funds in a security of equivalent risk
to the project), less the cost of the investment.' This rule places the
fair use focus on the question whether a change in facts-here the
legal protection afforded copyrights-would affect an investment
decision, which is precisely the analysis needed for this factor.
Choosing to permit reverse engineering, and thus to permit
competition in the Sega aftermarket, will likely diminish the expected
264. Id. at 566-67 (quoting 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.10[D] at p. 1-87) (emphasis added).
265. The standard is a modified version of the standard set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 810 (1976).
266. For a more detailed discussion of the process by which project net present values are
calculated, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 37, at 12-15.
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return on Sega's investment relative to the returns that could be had in
a regime in which reverse engineering was not fair use. By increasing
the risk, Sega would not realize the number of sales it would under the
more protective regime. This in turn reduces the discounted cash flow
figures (either through a reduction in the number of sales projected or,
what is the same thing, an increase in the estimated risk that the
original sales figures would not be reached). The willingness to invest
in intellectual property, relative to a more protective regime, likewise
would be reduced.
The conceptual rule derived from this standard is easy to state: If
Accolade's copying facilitates the foreclosure of enough of Sega's sales
and potential sales that Sega would not have invested in either its
game console system or any given video game ex ante, then Accolade's
fair use defense should fail as a matter of law, regardless of the
outcome of the other three fair use factors. If, as may well be the case,
Accolade's use had a positive effect on demand for Sega's consoles,
this effect would go into the mix in Accolade's favor; depending on the
facts of any given case, such positive feedback. effects might well be
conclusive. Because Sega's revenues from the system are constrained
by the popularity of the consoles, an increase in the popularity of the
consoles would at a minimum increase Sega's potential revenues. If a
de minimis portion of Sega's expected returns would be lost, this factor
would weigh in Accolade's favor. At the point the copyright holder
has been assured sufficient returns to induce investment in intellectual
property, copyright's utilitarian focus is satisfied and its principal
concern for enhancing the variety of intellectual property available in
the market should take precedence. If, as might often likely be the
case, no such clear determination could be made, the factor should tip
in favor of the copyright holder on the ground that the costs of
erroneous decisions are asymmetric. It is more important to secure
returns for those who create technology in the first instance, and thus
to secure the creation of the technology from which further innovation
will spring, than it is to secure the right to copy that technology once it
is made. If mistakes create disincentives to invest in intellectual
property, issues regarding the fair use of such will be moot.
One of course cannot pretend that this rule can be precisely
applied with ease in actual cases. There are numerous practical
difficulties with such a rule that will vary according to firms and
industries. Firms may have different "hurdle rates" for investment; of
two rational firms one might automatically accept a positive net
present value investment (assuming the availability of capital through
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financing or retained earnings), while another might reject the same
investment in the hope that an investment with a higher net present
value could be found. Even without such relatively idiosyncratic
factors, arriving at a good estimate of the relevant variables would be
extremely difficult. 7 And as objective truth about such matters simply
does not exist outside the models of financial economics, calculations
of one side's experts could readily be challenged by an opponent's
experts, thus increasing the costs of litigation while arguably doing
little to enhance the accuracy of the ultimate determination.
Nevertheless, those shortcomings are endemic to any serious
analysis of the question; they are a product of the decision to resolve
such issues through a judicial process rather than some other. Any
serious materiality analysis, implicit or explicit, makes assumptions
about firms' investment behavior, whether those assumptions are
acknowledged in the analysis or not. As discussed above, Sega too
hastily assumed that Accolade would not preempt much of Sega's
aftermarket, but it also assumed, without any discussion, that a small
reduction in Sega's share of its aftermarket would not affect its
willingness to invest in intellectual property." From an ex ante
perspective, that may or may not be true, though with the high fixed
and low variable costs characteristic of software it is perhaps a safe
assumption. But we should not be satisfied with guesses and
assumptions when analytical tools are available to help. Just as it will
267. At a minimum, one would need to know the amount investors expected the firm to
make, discounted by the probability of failure, and the return available on investments of similar
risk. None of these figures is easily derived, however, and seemingly small alterations in
assumptions can produce large differences in value. For example, assume a firm undertakes to
develop a program that will require an initial investment of $1 million, a $300,000 investment at
the end of the first year of development, and a $300,000 investment at the end of the second year;
assuming a discount rate (cost of capital) of 15%, the present value of the cost of the investment
is $1,487,800: the $1 million immediate cost plus (($300,000 x .870) + ($300,000 x .756) (The
multipliers in this note are taken from standard present value and annuity tables.). Assume
further that the software will generate $650,000 in revenue for four years beginning at the end of
year 2; the revenue over the expected life of the project is thus $1,859,000 ($650,000 x 2.86). As
this is the value after two years, it must be discounted ($1,859,000 x .756), yielding a present value
of revenues of $1,405,404 and a net present value of ($82,396). This investment is a money-loser,
and will not be undertaken by a rational firm. If we alter the risk associated with the project,
however, such as by increasing the scope of the copyright, a different result may be obtained.
Assume that, due to an increase in protection from copyright, the proper discount rate for the
investment is 12%. Under that assumption the cost is $1,507,000 and the revenues are $1,976,000,
discounted to $1,574,872. The present value of the investment under these assumptions is
$67,872; this investment will be undertaken and copyright's purpose of promoting innovation will
be achieved.
268. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:771
REGULATING COMPETITION IN THE INFORMATION AGE
not do simply to assume that only a small portion of the market will be
foreclosed, so it will not do simply to assume that whatever portion of
the market is foreclosed will or will not be significant in terms of the
copyright laws. Firms are not mysterious black boxes whose decisions
may simply be assumed to conform to the dictates of copyright or any
other area of substantive law. Those decisions must be analyzed in
light of the internal economic processes by which the decisions are
made.
2. Reverse Engineering, Replication, And Essential Facilities
What, the patient reader may justifiably ask, has all this to do with
the essential facilities doctrine? The answer is that, particularly in
Kodak-style aftermarkets, the scope of the fair use defense in the
reverse engineering context is a key to making sense of the question
whether the "facility" (in these cases the software interface) is capable
of being replicated. This in turn is a key to whether the natural
monopoly conditions necessary for sensible application of the essential
facilities doctrine are present in a given case. This question was not
presented as such in Sega, but the analytical approach taken in that
case is necessary to resolve it. To see why, we may simply add an
antitrust counterclaim to Accolade's defense of Sega's infringement
action: Assume Accolade alleges that Sega is attempting to exclude it
from the aftermarket for Sega-compatible software, and thus raises an
essential facilities claim in an effort to gain compulsory access to
Sega's software.
The addition of a counterclaim presents an important definitional
issue, similar to the question whether MAI's diagnostic software could
be considered a facility apart from MAI's computers: what, exactly, is
the "facility" to which Accolade would demand access? Sega's console
is not an input to Accolade, any more than a car is an input to a tire
manufacturer; the console is a complementary good necessary for the
software to satisfy consumer demand for a video game system, and
vice versa. Moreover, the market evidence showing three firms
actively competing with different consoles demonstrates conclusively
that consoles themselves do not possess natural monopoly
characteristics. Accolade's claim thus would necessarily rest on the
narrower theory that the ability to interface with Sega's console was a
facility essential for Accolade to compete in the market for Sega-
compatible computer games. Absent the ability to reverse engineer
software, Accolade would say, it could satisfy one element of a valid
essential facilities claim-the interface would not be replicable at any
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cost. Though this would be a consequence of copyright's grant of
protection to Sega, rather than natural monopoly, the competitive
effect would be the same.
This modification to Accolade's defenses cleanly presents the
question at the heart of the antitrust/copyright debate: may
compatibility-the ability for two systems to interface-count as a
"facility" for antitrust purposes? Unlike most of the traditional
antitrust essential facilities cases, compatibility is of course not a
separate input; it is a feature of two systems rather than a product or
service itself. The distinction between inputs and compatibility is
unstable. Some programs are sold whose sole purpose is to translate
data from one software format to another-allowing a file written on
WordPerfect, for example, to be stored and edited in a format that
Microsoft Word could use. Under the Jefferson Parish approach' it
would follow that a "market" for interface code exists, and this would
tend to drive the analysis back toward more familiar ground. But we
should not allow the definitional question to distract us from the larger
point. Consumers have no desire for video game software as such, they
want to play video games, which is to say they desire the product of
the complementary relationship between the video game and the
console. A software producer such as Accolade thus always has the
option of building its own consoles for its own games. While this will
not get Accolade into the Sega aftermarket, it will allow Accolade to
sell a complete video game entertainment system, which is what
consumers are buying. Assuming (as Accolade assured the Ninth
Circuit was the case) that Accolade's games are distinctive, Accolade's
software will likely stand on its own regardless whether it is on a
Nintendo, Sega, or Accolade system. Copyright's interest in the
production of software would thus be satisfied, though at some cost.
On the other hand, if the cost of switching from a Sega console to an
Accolade console, or of buying one of each type of console, is
prohibitive, and if reverse engineering were permitted, one would
expect separate interface software to be designed and sold.
No matter how technology advances, the antitrust analysis
remains the same. A facility is replicable, and thus not essential insofar
as the antitrust laws are concerned, so long as reverse engineering is
permitted as fair use.' If a firm can reverse engineer software at a
269. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984).
270. This of course includes the assumptions that no copyrightable code is incorporated into
the work of the firm engaging in the reverse engineering and that, as was the case in Sega, only
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cost that allows it to make a profit from an aftermarket, it will do so,
as Accolade did. If a firm cannot do so, it will not. Whether reverse
engineering is profitable will be a function of the complexity of the
reverse engineering task and the potential size of the aftermarket
(along with the constant concerns of the risk associated with projected
returns and the existence of possibly more remunerative projects in
which to invest). Some software aftermarkets may be so small that the
returns they offer will not justify investment in reverse engineering. It
does not follow, however, that with respect to such markets
compatibility becomes an essential facility. By hypothesis the market
in such cases offered an adequate return for the firm that created the
market; that the market will not support both that firm and an
aftermarket competitor does not make it a natural monopoly market.
In most conceivable cases, an aftermarket software producer will have
the option of building its own platform for its software and competing
in the primary market. As noted above, the costs incurred to enter
primary markets are not a warrant for invocation of antitrust; they are
simply a fact of business life that cannot be changed without serious
anticompetitive distributional consequences.
It is important to stress here that the foregoing analysis does not
imply that without the ability to reverse engineer software code,
antitrust would have an appropriate role to play in software markets.
If firms could not copy code for the purpose of achieving
interoperability, the "facility" of interoperability would not be
replicable. But this would be a consequence of the strength of the
copyright, and thus would not properly be redressed through the
invocation of antitrust. If Congress wants to allow copyrightholders to
preclude any copying at all, in order to extract revenues from both the
expressive elements of a copyrighted work and through the ability to
interface with that work, that is Congress' business. As noted at length
above, antitrust has no ability to determine whether a copyright is too
strong, and thus cannot properly be invoked to tinker with the
parameters of the copyright.
the noncopyrightable interface code would be adapted into the firm's own software. Any use of
copyrightable code would fall outside this analysis; because use of copyrightable code would be
unnecessary to achieve compatibility, which by hypothesis is the "facility" in question, the
reverse engineer would have no recourse under antitrust principles to justify its conduct, which
would be judged solely under copyright standards.
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C. Strategic Contractual Behavior And The Essential Facilities Doctrine
Should that be the end of the analysis? Could a firm ever invoke
the antitrust laws to argue that it should not be required to engage in
reverse engineering, assuming the law permitted it to do so and that it
would do so in compliance with the law? Or should a defendant that
engages in anticompetitive strategic behavior be penalized under
antitrust generally, or under the essential facilities doctrine in
particular, or both? Take the claim, asserted in Data General 2 (and
Olympia Leasing),' that the creator of a system that results in an
aftermarket (such as a minicomputer or, less plausibly, telephone
systems sales), carries an obligation to maintain the aftermarket for
firms that choose to enter it. Data General's experience with ISOs
prior to the Grumman suit had been varied.'7 When it began
manufacturing computers in the 1970s, Data General had been wary
of ISOs, which were often comprised of former Data General
employees. 4 Data General feared ISO firms would violate Data
General's intellectual property rights or misappropriate its trade
secrets2 75 At one point Data General filed suit against an ISO, which
resulted in a settlement in which the ISO agreed to return to Data
General any proprietary information certain former Data General
employees had taken, and Data General agreed to authorize the ISO
to use Data General's proprietary information in the future. 6 For the
next several years, Data General followed a relatively liberal policy:
selling or licensing its diagnostics directly to ISOs; allowing ISOs to
use diagnostics belonging to the owners of its computers when the
ISOs worked on them; allowing ISO technicians to attend Data
General training; and even repairing some circuit boards at the
request of ISOs.m This more liberal policy lasted until the mid-1980s,
when Data General began refusing to allow ISOs to purchase its
diagnostic devices, refusing to repair parts for ISO customers, and
refusing to allow ISO technicians to attend Data General training.Z
78
271. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188.
272. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir.
1986).
273. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1152-54.
274. Id. at 1155-54.
275. Id. at 1153.
276. Id. at 1155.
277. Id. at 1153-54.
278. Id. at 1154. One could perhaps correlate the timing of Data General's change of heart
on the ISO question with the beginning of the end of the minicomputer market and the
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As noted briefly above, Grumman contended that Aspen Skiing
established that a "monopolist that has helped a market to develop
may not withdraw its support without legitimate business
justifications."'  The First Circuit viewed it somewhat differently,
stating the problem presented by Grumman's defense as "whether
(and to what extent) the antitrust laws, in the absence of any statutory
exemption, must tolerate short-term harm to the competitive process
when such harm is caused by the otherwise lawful exercise of an
economically potent 'monopoly' in a copyrighted work."'  The two
questions are related, however, if one recasts Grumman's argument
slightly to say that Data General induced Grumman's investment in
the service market in order to strengthen its own position in the
primary market. This case would then present issues of opportunism
not presented by MAI and, contrary to Professor Fox's contention, not
presented by Kodak either.21 Thus recast, the argument presents the
possibility of suboptimal investment, and harm to consumer welfare,
based upon conduct by Data General and reciprocal conduct by
Grumman amounting to a tacit agreement, in the economic if not legal
ascendance of powerful personal computers. The ISOs have plausibly claimed that, faced with a
doomed market, Data General and other firms in its position cast about for ways to wrest the last
drop of revenue from the systems they had in place. One way to do this was through
supracompetitive pricing in the service aftermarket, in which Data General could profitably
charge just under its customers' switching costs. This is of course the end-period problem
discussed above in connection with Kodak. Though real, the problem presents mostly
distributional issues between Data General and its customers, and Data General still faces
certain reputational constraints to the extent it hopes to be a repeat player in different market
segments, though the constraints are admittedly weakened by the demise of the minicomputer
market. The previous discussion regarding the advisability of relying on such factors as a warrant
for invoking antitrust applies here as well.
279. Id. at 1188. Though the First Circuit rejected this interpretation, its reasoning elided
more of Aspen Skiing than it explained. We thus cannot be sure that Aspen Skiing will not lead to
more mischief in the First Circuit, to say nothing of the rest of the country.
280. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1152.
281. Professor Fox at one point casts the issue decided in Kodak as concerning "a cut-off of
well-performing independents by the firm that had induced their investment in the market." Fox,
supra note 105, at 761 (emphasis added). But there is no evidence of inducement in the ordinary
sense in the Kodak opinion itself. At most, the ISOs could argue that Kodak induced their
investment by developing its copiers and thus their aftermarket. But this would seem to better
support Kodak's free-rider defense to its policy than any allegations of wrongful behavior. See
generally Kodak, 504 U.S. at 451. It would be uniquely perverse, even for antitrust, to hold that
the development of a new product constituted some sort of attractive nuisance to firms wishing to
engage in derivative activities. The situation might be different if the parties had some sort of
agreement, such as in the cash register case to which Professor Fox analogized Kodak, Fox, supra
note 105, at 761-67, but likely not. In that case the parties' rights should be defined by their
contract; a party's failure to ensure a continued supply of parts in the contract would not suffice
to create an antitrust violation, particularly where other parties stepped in to fill the void.
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sense, subsequently breached by Data General without payment of
damages to Grumman.2
Let us examine the components of this claim, and in the process
move it from the mixed hardware/software context of ISO claims
(which in any event will fade in time as the installed base expires) into
a wholly software environment. For Data General, substitute the firm
in our second hypothetical, which makes an application program for
home banking ("A"). For Grumman, substitute a software firm that
does not have a home banking program, but does have a program that
will calculate foreign currency hedges and do other similarly
impressive things ("C"). When A enters the market it will be
concerned, like all firms, with expanding its share as rapidly as
possible. It will also have an eye towards its competitors' products, and
will seek ways to make its software more desirable. Assuming there is
a market for home currency hedges, the possibility of having C's
program work with A's program will be enticing to A; and as C has no
program of its own, the possibility for mutual benefit is obvious.
Suppose A and C agree that A will provide C with the code necessary
to interface with A's program for five years, and C agrees that it will
write the interface into its program and aggressively market the
program for the length of the contract.
Suppose that after 18 months A is established as the standard
home banking program (with, say, 75% of the market), in part because
consumers desired to hedge currency at home and thus valued C's
compatibility with A. Suppose further that A could maintain 60% of
the market even without C, but that C has no immediately viable
alternative to compatibility with A. Lastly, suppose that A informs C
that the original agreement covered only version A.1 of the home
banking program, that A will be coming out with a new version A.1.1,
which adds cosmetic bells and whistles to the program, and that A
offers to enter into an agreement to provide C with the necessary
interface code if C will sign an agreement including the same terms as
the original agreement plus a license fee of 30% of C's profits on each
program sold. Assume for the moment that A's interpretation of the
original agreement is both wrong and asserted in bad faith. Does
antitrust have a role to play here?
282. Payment of damages is important in this context not because breach of the agreement
would entail the transfer of wealth between firms; as we saw in discussing Kodak such a transfer
is unobjectionable in and of itself, at least on economic grounds. But failure to enforce
agreements would increase uncertainty and thus risk and thus deter parties from embarking on
ventures that would otherwise be profitable under a regime of contractual enforcement.
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The argument in favor of some form of relief for C is fairly
straightforward. A induced C to commit resources over an identified
period of time to the creation of a product the existence of which
conferred a material benefit on A. Having obtained the benefit of
increased popularity (market share) of its program, A then switched
courses before the period was even halfway over and, using the power
it had obtained in part through C's performance of the agreement,
held up C in an effort to extort more favorable terms. The extortion
arises because C must have compatibility with A to sell its program,
and to sell updates of its program to its installed-base owners. Either
reverse engineering A's code in order to achieve compatibility or
writing its own home-banking software (including such code as was
necessary to allow owners of A's software to transition smoothly to
C's new program), would take time and money, which C might have a
hard time getting if it could not sell programs compatible with the
newest version of A. While such options might be viable in the long
run, as C could presumably obtain financing if it could make money
through either option, C could have a serious and perhaps fatal short-
run problem.
Under such circumstances, could compatibility with A's software
be considered an essential facility for C, such that C could bring suit
under the antitrust laws to compel A to provide C with the necessary
code? The preceding analysis compels the conclusion that C could not.
First, in such a situation A's opportunistic behavior would be the only
element of legitimate legal concern. Opportunism here has two
components: inducement and alteration. Inducement is necessary to
distinguish this hypothetical from cases in which a firm such as C
independently developed software compatible with A's software
without dealing with A. A could bear no responsibility for such a
decision, and thus could not bear responsibility for any incompatibility
that might be caused by upgrades to A's original program. In such a
situation C will have assumed the risk that A might change its
program. C's decision to commit its resources to A-compatible
software will reflect that risk, and thus presumably would not reflect a
suboptimal investment of resources.' Where A induced the
investment with certain promises, however, the possibility of
283. C's position in such a case would be no different from that of a lunch counter that
opened near a factory to provide food for the workers. Absent some agreement with the factory,
the owners of the lunch counter will have assumed the risk that the factory will close, and their
business will go with it.
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suboptimal investment exists. A's opportunistic alteration of the deal,
if unpunished, would increase the risk of such agreements and thus
decrease the likelihood that they would be formed, resulting in harm
to social welfare to the extent such agreements are desirable.
While relief for C is plainly in order, it does not follow that the
relief should come in an antitrust package. Following Kodak we might
say that a cognizable antitrust "market" for A-compatible software
exists; that A has power in this market; and that compatibility with A
is necessary for C to sell its software. We might further say that, at
least in the short run, it is not economically feasible for C to replicate
the interface with A by, for example, reverse engineering, or to write
its own platform program and thus move into the applications market
to compete against A.' Such a sequence of reasoning, which could
imply that recourse to the essential facilities doctrine would be proper
in such cases, does more to show the perils of the Court's analysis in
Kodak than anything else.
If we conclude that C has no legitimate legal claim to A's code
beyond the period of the agreement, it follows that C is only harmed
by the premature termination of the agreement. And should A
deprive C of the benefits of the contract, the proper remedy would be
for breach of the agreement, not for violation of the antitrust laws.
Enforcement of the agreement according to its terms would give C
everything to which it was entitled; antitrust would give it more, and
indeed, would give C too much. The imposition of treble damages and
attorney's fees would interfere with the efficient operation of the
contract by penalizing what might otherwise be an efficient breach by
A. The risk that merely signing a contract could lead to trouble with
the antitrust laws could reduce the willingness of A firms to sign such
agreements, posing a risk of suboptimal investment that is the rough
reciprocal of the risk posed by not enforcing the agreement at all. As
noted above, antitrust has no role to play in refereeing contractual
disputes. Allowing antitrust claims to proceed in such cases will merely
distort the surrounding legal landscape and impede the operation of
doctrines better suited to resolving the cases.
Approximately the same analysis compels us to reject the
invocation of the antitrust laws in the intermediate case presented by
Data General-in which the two firms have no formal contract, but in
which one firm tolerates and perhaps encourages another to enter a
market because such entry confers a benefit upon both the entrant and
284. This would be particularly true if A surprised C with its plans, without advance warning.
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the existing firm. The contractual relationship of the firms in such a
case may be ambiguous, ranging from no agreement at all to an
implied undertaking by a Data General not to prejudice a Grumman
once it had entered the market. The outcome of such cases, however,
must be determined by where they fall on the contractual continuum,
not by antitrust. If there is no agreement, the risks of suboptimal
investment are low (a firm will presumably account for the risks it
assumes), and there is no warrant for an antitrust claim. If there is an
implied agreement, the parties should seek enforcement of the
agreement, not file a monopolization claim. The claim that Aspen
Skiing allows antitrust to be brought to bear in such cases is simply
wrong.
D. Network Effects and the "Tipping" Argument for the Essential Facilities
Doctrine
Computer software possesses certain economic characteristics
that present difficult issues at the intersection of law and economics.
These include the tendency of software to improve rapidly, thus
mooting older versions and the statutory period of copyright, and the
high fixed and low variable (and thus declining average) costs of
producing software. Software also is characterized by "network
effects," which means that the value of software to a given purchaser
increases as additional consumers buy the software as well.' The
more popular an application program is, for example, the more likely
it is that others with whom a consumer deals will have or be able to
use the program, making it easier to share data. Similarly, firms that
produce complementary software will be more willing to develop such
programs for popular applications programs than for unpopular
programs for the simple reason that popular programs will support
more sales. Professors Katz and Shapiro usefully distinguish between
direct and indirect network effects.' The former term denotes
networks that are physically linked or direct interactions using the
same system; examples include telephones, fax machines, and
language.' The latter term denotes complementary relationships
between products or simple demand-side economies of scale; the more
people who own a particular brand of car or operating system, for
285. For excellent and only slightly technical discussions of this concept, see Katz and
Shapiro, supra note 18; Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How To Compete:
Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 117 (1994).
286. Katz and Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 250.
287. Id.
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example, the easier it will be for existing owners to find spare parts or
application programs for their existing goods. 
2
Network effects complicate legal analysis because, depending
upon the characteristics of a given market and the strategies of the
various firms, it may be difficult to tell whether a given policy is
procompetitive. For example, there is evidence that computer game
manufacturers accept low margins on their consoles in order to expand
the market for compatible computer games.' Depending upon the
strength of copyrights, and-the costs of switching to a different system,
low-margin hardware pricing may allow manufacturers to earn more
than they could by charging higher prices on their consoles. At the
same time, expanding the ownership base of consoles might induce
entry into the aftermarkets for software compatible with each
manufacturer's hardware. This would promote innovation in
intellectual property and constrain monopoly pricing in the
aftermarket. If either option is possible, what position should we take
if consoles are priced below cost? In normal circumstances this might
be sufficient to state a predation claim, but given the positive feedback
effects with respect to providers of complementary goods (indirect
network effects), can we say that a firm is likely to recoup its losses?
And if the firm were likely to recoup its losses even in the face of entry
and competition by firms providing complementary software of their
own, thus producing a competitive aftermarket, is there really a
problem for antitrust to cure?
The delightful economic puzzles presented by network effects
take many forms, and this article cannot do them all justice.' One
aspect of network effects markets is particularly relevant to the
essential facilities debate; this is the phenomenon of "tipping" among
competing systems. As Professors Katz and Shapiro state the problem:
In markets with network effects, there is a natural tendency towards
de facto standardization, which means everyone using the same
system. Because of the strong positive-feedback elements, systems
markets are especially prone to 'tipping,' which is the tendency of
288. Id. at 96.
289. Id. at 101.
290. These puzzles include the predation question mentioned in the text, the possibility of
profitable leveraging strategies from ordinary markets into network effects markets, the
possibility that network effects markets will be too small (suffer unexploited potential gains
from trade) because existing users cannot compensate prospective users for the benefits they
confer on existing users, the peculiar sensitivity of such markets to fluctuations in consumer
expectations (all consumers want to own VHS rather than Beta machines) and thus the
possibility of anticompetitive practices through manipulation of expectations, and the like.
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one system to pull away from its rivals in popularity once it has
gained an initial edge.
3 l
In and of itself, tipping is neither good nor bad from an economic
perspective. If a firm owns the network to which a market tips, its
increased revenues will offset the losses of firms whose products did
not become the standard. As discussed above, this distributional
consequence should be of no moment to antitrust.
Tipping does present the risk, however, that the system that
becomes the standard will be or become inferior to some other system.
If that happens, there is a risk of social welfare loss because consumers
will be reluctant to depart from the standard for the simple reason that
it is the standard, and consumers will face costs both in terms of old
equipment abandoned and costs to retrain personnel in switching.
Some thoughtful commentators have suggested that such forces are
sufficiently strong that "computer operating systems serve as 'essential
facilities' in computer hardware markets. Unless a firm can get onto
the network, its products will be at a great disadvantage relative to
those that can run the vast stock of application programs designed for
the industry standard."'
Some believe there is empirical market evidence of such welfare
losses, and the examples on which they rely are worth exploring in
detail. In 1985 Paul A. David wrote an influential article suggesting
that network effects could create social welfare losses by locking
consumers into suboptimal technologies.' His principal example,
which quickly found its way into the legal literature,' involves the
configuration of keys on standard keyboards.' It has been invoked by
counsel for certain of Microsoft's competitors in the course of arguing
for enhanced antitrust scrutiny of that firm's activities, 26 and was cited
by Judge Boudin in his First Circuit concurrence in Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.' Keyboards exhibit
network effects because the value of any given configuration depends
291. Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 250, at 106.
292. Menell, Tailoring,supra note 152, at 1366. Professor Menell's later works suggest that
he might have softened his position on this issue to some degree.
293. Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REV. 332, May 1985
(Vol. 75, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the 97th Annual Meeting of the Amer. Econ. Assoc.).
294. E.g., Menell, Tailoring, supra note 152, at 1340.
295. Id. Known as the QWERTY configuration for reasons that will be obvious to the reader
at a glance the next time a keyboard is encountered.
296. See Gary L. Reback, Free The Market, CAL. LAWYER, March 1995, at 25.
297. 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 165 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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on how many people are trained to use it quickly. A firm that adopted
a non-standard keyboard for its word processors would have to invest
resources in training typists unfamiliar with the keyboard, and would
have a harder time finding temporary typists when needed.
Insofar as it is relevant to software and antitrust, the argument is
that the cost of switching from a dominant technology to an arguably
superior technology may keep consumers locked into an inferior
system, thus implying a need for an antitrust remedy. As one
commentator has summarized it, the argument is as follows:
Primitive typewriters were unreliable mechanical devices, and the
QWERTY keyboard was, therefore, deliberately designed to be
dysfunctional so that typists would not strike the keys so rapidly that
the device would jam. Obviously, modern software and computers
can process keystrokes far more quickly, yet consumers are locked
into the dysfunctional QWERTY standard . . . . Superior
keyboard layouts were developed years ago but were unsuccessful in
dislodging the clearly inferior design that had established itself as an
early standard3m
The claim that "superior keyboard standards were developed
years ago" rests upon a study by the U.S. Navy in 1943 that concluded
a different keyboard, the Dvorak keyboard, was more efficient than
the standard model.29 From this evidence, some have concluded that
firms using the QWERTY keyboard have been incurring opportunity
costs for 50 years. This is a strong contention. Why do keyboard
consumers tolerate such costs? Could not schools and temporary
agencies teach typing on both systems, in a way similar to the teaching
of multiple word-processing programs? Are the costs of learning an
additional keyboard pattern really so high? At least to the extent one
believes that consumers are better judges of their utility functions than
the Navy, there is reason to be suspicious: at a minimum we may safely
conclude that the difference in efficiency between the two systems is
not large; otherwise switching costs (which cumulate over time) would
eventually be overcome.
There is more to it than that. There is good and perhaps
compelling evidence that the entire QWERTY saga is a myth, the
economic equivalent of alligators in the New York City sewer
system." As Professors Liebowitz and Margolis tell it:
298. Reback, supra note 296, at 25.
299. Id.
300. Or, more aptly in this context, of the lighthouse in economics. See generally R.H. COASE,
"The Lighthouse in Economics," in THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 187 (1988) (noting
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[A]lmost every element of [the QWERTY] tale is false . . . . The
QWERTY keyboard was not created to slow down typing speed.
Early on, there were other publicized touch typists using other
keyboards. The Navy study was very poorly documented and
designed, and appears to have been conducted by Navy Lieutenant
Commander August Dvorak, creator and patent holder on the
keyboard bearing his name. A later, carefully constructed and
controlled study, performed for the General Services
Administration in the 1950s, demonstrated quite the opposite results
from the Navy study. More recent studies indicate that there is
practically no difference in typing speed between the two keyboard
designs. The Dvorak typewriter keyboard, it turns out, is a rather
poor empirical base upon which to support a theory.
301
Anecdotes cannot supplant analysis, and the apparent disrobing
of the QWERTY emperor no more establishes that antitrust may not
be invoked to remedy supposed welfare losses in "tipped" markets
than the anecdote itself could establish that antitrust should play such
a role. Nevertheless, it is a cautionary tale that reminds us that
consumer choices in the market deserve some respect. At a minimum,
we must demand rigorous proof that the system consumers adopt is in
fact inferior to a viable alternative system, and that the failure of that
competing system to supplant the existing standard is in fact due to
network effects. Without such evidence and analysis, strong
conclusions about consumers being "locked into" a "dysfunctional
standard" are not supportable.' As yet, "the a priori case for network
externalities is treacherous and the empirical case is yet to be
presented."'
Apart from the tenuous empirical foundation provided by
QWERTY, however, the theoretical problem of tipping remains,
although its extent and probability are still quite open to debate. The
extremely low variable (and thus declining average) cost of producing
software exacerbates the problem. The cost curve resembles that of
natural monopoly, and thus presents a facially plausible case for
frequent use by economists of lighthouses as examples of public goods justifying governmental
intervention and describing actual British system of levying lighthouse fees on shippers).
301. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8
J. EcoN. PERSP. 133, 147 (1995) [hereinafter Network Externality]. Dvorak also conducted other
studies, though his methodology suggested that he had particular outcomes in mind. In one study,
Dvorak had students at the University of Chicago laboratory school trained on his keyboard and
compared the speed at which they learned the keyboard with the speed at which students in
conventional high schools learned the QWERTY keyboard. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis,
The Fable of the Keys, 33 J. L. & ECON. 1, 9 (1990).
302. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Network Externality, supra note 301, at 146.
303. Id. at 149.
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invoking the essential facilities doctrine to compel access to the
standard. For example, suppose one operating system dominated the
market and that its architecture was closed-meaning that it asserted
its copyrights against firms seeking to write application programs to
work with the operating system.A A firm that wrote such programs
could contend that because of network effects, switching costs (which
could be considered a collateral concomitant of network effects), and
declining average costs, the operating system code was an essential
facility to which the firm was entitled to access under the antitrust
laws. Should such arguments prevail?
There are three reasons to reject the use of the essential facilities
doctrine to compel access to software, even in the presence of network
effects. The first, and relatively weak, reason is that software cost
curves, though they resemble natural monopoly, do not reflect true
natural monopoly conditions. Recall that a natural monopoly market
is one in which a single firm can satisfy market demand at a lower cost
than two or more firms.' Firms in such markets do indeed tend to
have declining average costs, but the reasoning may not be reversed;
not all firms with declining average costs are natural monopolists. It
follows that operating systems are replicable and thus do not fit the
economic requirements for invocation of the essential facilities
doctrine. The presence in the market of multiple operating systems is
proof enough of this point. A firm that wishes to have its application
software run on an operating system thus has the option of writing
such a system. That is no doubt an expensive and time-consuming
option. That potential entrants must replicate the capital expenditures
of firms already in a market, and may find it difficult to do so,
however, does not entitle them to subsidies from the existing firms.'
Still, the natural monopoly argument is not as persuasive in the
presence of network effects as it is in some other contexts (which is
not to say that it is wrong). Because network effects may impede shifts
304. Empirical evidence does suggest, however, that the more tightly closed an architecture
is the less likely it is to become a standard.
305. See supra notes 21 and 22.
306. This would be true even if the existing firm was allowed to charge a royalty for access to
its code. The amount of the royalty would presumably have to be capped by reference to some
benchmark. Otherwise the existing firm would simply demand a royalty high enough to keep the
potential entrant out of the market. If it were profitable for the existing firm to charge such a
royalty, it presumably would do so rather than close its architecture irrevocably. A firm forced to
depart from a presumptively profit-maximizing policy of noncooperation for the benefit of its
competitors thus may fairly be said to be granting them a subsidy, even if only in the form of
foregone revenues.
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from one competitive equilibrium (or standard) to another, entry into
the market by new firms touting new potential standards will be less
attractive (supply will be relatively less elastic) than would be the case
in an ordinary market.' To the extent that entry is deterred, the
competitive process will work more sluggishly than would be the case
without network effects. This means that a single firm possessing a
standard in a network effects market might be extremely hard to
dislodge, even though it would not be a natural monopolist. This line
of argument helpfully focuses on the true risk to social welfare posed
by the tipping phenomenon-the social loss comprised of the
difference between the inferior existing standard and the superior new
standard to which the market has difficulty shifting-rather than on
the size or profitability of the firm owning the standard, which may be
quite large.
Keeping this focus in mind, the question becomes whether
antitrust can meaningfully improve the ability of the market transition
from one standard to another when a superior standard appears. The
first step in answering this question is to analyze how well transitions
may be made without antitrust, which leads us back to Sega and the
ability of firms to reverse engineer software to achieve systems
compatibility. If copyright allows firms to reverse engineer software in
order to achieve compatibility, then new entrants will be able to build
software bridges from old standards to new, facilitating transition and
thus reducing (if not eliminating) the welfare loss associated with
tipping. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,'
though different in important ways from Sega,2 is a case in point.
307. It should be stressed that network effects are by no means guaranteed to impede
transitions from one efficient equilibrium to another. As Professors Katz and Shapiro note,
"there is no general theoretical result implying excess inertia in market equilibria. Indeed, given
the possibilities of multiple equilibria, markets may also exhibit the opposite of excess
inertia . . . . [T]he market may be biased in favor of a new, superior, but incompatible
technology." Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 250, at 108. The point is a
theoretical one and the evidence in each relevant market must be examined to determine
whether impediments exist.
308. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 165 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
309. In particular, the interface code Accolade sought to incorporate in its computer games
was itself purely functional and thus not copyrightable. Lotus's menu command hierarchy Was
arguably expressive and, prior to the First Circuit's ruling, copyrightable. And, unlike Accolade,
Borland copied Lotus's software precisely for its expressive characteristics. Importantly,
however, as Judge Boudin rightly noted in his concurrence, Borland did so only to permit Lotus
users to transfer their own investment in learning Lotus's program to Borland's program. Id. at
821 (Boudin, J. concurring). Similar to Accolade, Borland's software competed on its own merits,
and thus did not deprive Lotus of a return on its investment in its software (as opposed to the
investment of its customers in learning the software). Id.
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Much has been written about Lotus, and more is surely on its way; this
is not the place to add to that debate.31 It is worth noting, as Judge
Boudin did in his concurrence, that at one point Lotus's 1-2-3
spreadsheet software "had such sway in the market that it has
represented the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet
commands." '311 Borland's copying of Lotus's menu command hierarchy
allowed consumers to transfer their investment in learning Lotus's
system to Borland's spreadsheet, and thus avoid the cost of re-learning
material they already had spent the time and money necessary to
learn. The law in this area is obviously in flux, and any legal
equilibrium built upon a 4-4 tie in the Supreme Court is quite
obviously unstable. But so long as copyright countenances limited
copying for the purposes of achieving hardware compatibility, or
building bridges between software standards, software markets will
find it easier to transfer from old equilibria to new. Social welfare
losses from network effects will thus be minimized, significantly
diminishing the force of any argument for bringing antitrust principles
into the picture.
The final reason to reject market tipping as a basis for invoking
the essential facilities doctrine in software network effects markets is
that such invocation could well make the network effects even
stronger, and thus make entry (and thus market discipline) more
sluggish. Antitrust cannot determine whether an existing standard is
310. It is worth noting, however, that Lotus adopted the relatively aggressive holding that
Lotus's menu command hierarchy was "an unprotectable method of operation" under section
102(b) of the Copyright Act. Id. at 818-19. This holding obviously facilitates compatibility, and
will thus aid in innovation and reduce the lock-in power of network effects. At the same time,
there is some risk that this will induce (or at least condone) behavior inconsistent with copyright;
Borland (like Accolade) was competing with Lotus on the merits of Borland's own spreadsheet
software, which was itself protected under copyright. Allowing Borland to build a bridge between
its program and Lotus's facilitated innovation by making it easier for Lotus users to transfer their
investment in learning a system to Borland's program (arguably superior, based on market
evidence). The situation arguably should be different if Borland did not attempt to compete on
the merits of its own creative work, but instead simply cloned Lotus's program and sold it in a
Borland package. See id. at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring). Fair use, which is a flexible concept that
examines numerous variables, would provide a more tailored approach to the problem, capable
of distinguishing between cases of bridge-building and cloning. Precisely because of its flexibility,
however, fair use outcomes are more difficult to predict than the court's relatively bright-line
holding under section 102(b). With uncertainty comes risk, and the possibility that some firms
would avoid normatively legitimate bridge-building for fear that a court would wrongly perceive
its actions to be illegitimate cloning and thus reject a fair use defense. Id. In the event other
circuits choose fair use as a more appropriate approach to the problem, the market preemption
analysis discussed above in connection with Sega would apply to such cases.
311. Id. (emphasis in original).
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efficient or should be abandoned in favor of a superior newcomer. At
most, the essential facilities doctrine could compel a firm owning a
standard to grant access to other firms on some economically
reasonable basis. If the owner of an operating system were precluded
from closing its architecture to firms seeking to write complementary
programs, more programs would likely be written for the operating
system, reinforcing one of the factors presumed to cause tipping. In
other words, it makes no sense to attempt to remedy inertia by adding




"Don't just do something, stand there!"
Dean Acheson"
The rapid evolution of computer software, its increasing
importance in the economy as a whole, and its novelty relative to
traditional forms of copyrighted works, contribute to a potentially
destructive atmosphere of urgency and confusion in the debate over
how the law should deal with competing software firms. To add to the
difficulty, the monetary stakes in these cases are enormous, including
the risk that an erroneous decision pushing protection for software too
far to either end of the spectrum will hamstring innovation and turn
what could be a smooth and efficient network into a Tower of Babel.
Add in the ambiguous economics of such markets, including the very
real possibility that positive feedback effects could cause any given
decision to boomerang on a court, and one is left with the conclusion
that the courts deserve very high marks for doing as well as they have.
Sega and Lotus promise to relieve many of the strains that could arise
in these markets; the ISO cases have properly rejected the essential
facilities concept, and the affirmation of copyrights in diagnostic
software, while unfortunate from a policy perspective, is essentially
compelled by the existing statutory scheme.




There is no room for sanguinity, however. The Court was only
one vote away from what might have been an entirely different
outcome in Lotus; and Justice Stevens, who recused himself from the
case, has some history of disfavoring bright-line rules of the type
adopted by the First Circuit.313 Apart from what may have been a
narrow escape for the cause of compatibility, the complex and
confusing aspects of competition in software markets tends to create a
desire on the part of both lawyers and judges for familiar and
seemingly established rules to apply. In such an environment, the law's
tendency to borrow concepts from one field to fill a gap in another is
heightened. This borrowing is always risky, but is made riskier by
balkanization within academe. Experts in a given subject, such as
copyright, have an understandable tendency to focus on those features
of the subject that need mending. Focusing on (and writing about)
what is right about a given doctrine is both less challenging and less
useful in pursuit of tenure. Unfortunately, this may lead to a belief
that the situation in the expert's field is so bad that things simply have
to be better elsewhere; thus copyright experts sometimes look to
antitrust to provide remedies for problems they fear will be
exacerbated by copyright, and the uncritical migration of legal
concepts is thus given academic imprimatur.314
At the risk of self-parody, I believe that under the present state of
the evidence and the present economic understanding of how network
effects markets transition between equilibrium points, the essential
facilities doctrine has no place in the legal regime being crafted to
regulate software. There are admittedly instances in which intellectual
property rights have been asserted to defeat competition in
circumstances where the purposes of the intellectual property laws are
not served. And the evolving economic understanding of network
effects does suggest the possibility of social welfare losses in software
markets. But there is as yet no basis to believe that antitrust can avoid
such losses. In addition, the fundamental issues raised by these
questions involve the proper scope of intellectual property rights.
313. His dissents in Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 243 (1993), and City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991),
both of which reversed jury verdicts for antitrust plaintiffs, tend to support this thesis. On the
other hand, Justice Stevens is also the author of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), which established a strong presumption (since weakened by Acuff-
Rose) that commercial uses of copyrighted material were not protected by fair use.
314. See Menell, Tailoring, supra note 152, at 1366 (suggesting application of essential
facilities doctrine to operating systems software).
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Antitrust simply does not have the analytical tools necessary to
provide coherent answers, which can only be derived from the
principles and goals of the intellectual property laws using the
analytical approach those laws embody.

